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ABSTRACT 
Many critics regard the late Milton as a republican, while others consider him a 
liberal. This is problematic, for prominent political historians argue that republican 
political thought is distinct from liberal political thought. How, then, can Milton be both a 
republican and a liberal? I have contributed to the answer of this question by examining 
Milton's late political thought in A Treatise of Civil Power (1659) and The Ready and Easy 
Way (second edition, April, 1660). John Locke may be legitimately regarded as having 
presented a definitive statement of liberal political thought. Thus, after presenting a 
comprehensive definition of liberalism, as it was formulated by Locke, we can see that 
Milton, in Of Civil Power, confonns with liberal political thought in a number of ways. 
Like Locke, Milton argues, on the one hand, that the state should not use force in matters of 
religion, but on the other hand argues that Catholics should not be tolerated by the state. 
Because Milton's political thought in Of Civil Power is the same in many important 
respects as Locke's political thought, there are strong grounds for thinking of Milton as a 
liberal in this tract. There are, however, no grounds for thinking of Milton as a republican 
in this tract. 
By taking the arguments of Machiavelli as their model, Skinner and Pocock provide 
us with a comprehensive definition of republican political thought. Milton's politica:l 
thought in The Ready and Easy Way is both consistent and inconsistent in a number of 
ways with both republican and liberal political thought. But this tract is more liberal than 
republican because the liberal notion that humans have a God-given natural freedom that 
government must protect is more prominent in this pamphlet than the republican notion that 
personal freedom is a privilege that must be earned. Like Locke, Milton also defends 
religious freedom and emphasises its importance, and he never expresses the republican 
notion of religion as a mere political tool. Moreover, like Locke, Milton expresses a 
Christian vision of history, which contrasts with Machiavelli's cyclical view of history. 
Overall, then, Milton is more of a liberal than a republican in The Ready and Easy Way. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
(i) 
Much recent Milton scholarship has been devoted to understanding the relationship 
between John Milton's late political thought and the two major traditions of post-
Renaissance English political thought, liberalism and republicanism. Some critics present 
Milton as a liberal, alleging that natural law theory is present in his work or that he is 
committed to equal rights. Others, however, have argued that Milton is a republican, since 
he is committed to the establishment of a republican government and the abolition of 
monarchy. I will now examine the arguments made by the authors in both of these groups, 
beginning with those who see the late Milton as a republican. 
Some critics have recently argued that Satan's rebellion in Paradise Lost (1667) is 
evidence of Milton's criticism of monarchy and his support for republican government. 
Roger Lejosne, for example, argues that Satan's encounter with Abdiel in Book V is 
representative of the pamphlet wars between Milton and Salmasius. Satan's anti-
monarchical republican sentiment reflects Milton's position in his debate with Salmasius, a 
staunch defender of the king's authority. In making Abdiel a kind of celestial Salmasius 
and Satan a hellish image of himself, Milton "made monarchy in Heaven justifY 
republicanism on earth" (106). Lejosne makes the same point, arguing that Milton thought 
he could rely on his readers to realise that "if the sole truly legitimate king was 'the son of 
God,' then whatever Salmasius and the other royalists said of earthly kings was true of him, 
but only him. . .. In other words, Salmasius was right and Milton was wrong in Heaven, 
but only in Heaven. And consequently Milton and the republicans were right on earth, 
where no man could rightly claim divine honours" (117). Armand Himy also interprets 
Paradise Lost in this way: 
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Satan's views on the tyranny of God serve several purposes. The immediate one is 
to illustrate Satan's lies. Accommodation and indirection, accepted as methods of 
interpretation from the outset, can leave no doubt as to what Milton means: God is 
no tyrant. But the description of tyranny is necessary to show what should be 
avoided in politics. Human kingship cannot fail to lapse into tyranny. (120) 
Himy concludes that in Milton's view "a commonwealth must be preferred to a monarchy" 
(121). 
Stephen Zwicker also argues that Paradise Lost represents Milton's rejection of 
monarchy. He writes that Milton had been "deprived of office and place" by the 
Restoration, and claims that "Paradise Lost is Milton's polemical answer to [this] 
disenfranchisement and exile. It is a justification and idealization of his role in a political 
cause now defeated" ("Lines" 248). With reference to Book XI, Zwicker claims that the 
aim of Milton's narrative of history is "subtly and completely to associate all monarchies 
with one another" ("Lines" 255). This leads Zwicker to determine that "Paradise Lost is a 
countermeasure to the restoration of kingship," and that "the rejection of kingship is crucial 
to the poet's confrontation with Restoration monarchy" ("Lines" 249, 255). Although 
Zwicker does not explicitly state that Milton is a republican, he asserts that "Milton must be 
read as the greatest protagonist of the 'good old cause"', that. is to say, English 
republicanism (Introduction. Politics o/Discourse 2). 
In "John Milton: Poet Against Empire," David Armitage also claims that Paradise 
Lost reflects Milton's republicanism. Armitage says that in The Discourses, Nicco16 
Machiavelli, a sixteenth-century Italian republican theorist, uses Rome as an example of 
how "an offensive posture towards the outside world ... led directly to servitude for the 
Roman people (The Discourses III.24): the liberty which had been won with the expulsion 
of the Kings ended with the dictatorships of Sulla and Marius" (208-209). Machiavelli 
concludes that to achieve political longevity a new republic should be defensive and non-
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expansionary. According to Annitage, Milton read The Discourses and accepted 
Machiavelli's reasoning. Thus, Cromwell's policy of imperial expansion "convinced Milton 
that Cromwell was the English Sulla who had fatally compromised the republic's fragile 
liberty" (214). Milton and the republicans feared that Cromwell's single person rule and 
costly expansionary designs would eventually lead to tyranny and the revival of kingship, 
as Machiavelli had warned. Armitage argues that Milton's criticism of Cromwell's policy 
of expansion is represented in Paradise Lost by Satan's colonisation of earth. Annitage 
writes, "though Satan had achieved his aim in the new world, the fruits of victory are at 
least as bitter as those of defeat, as Satan and his fellow-demons are all transformed into 
serpents in the moment of their triumph, 'the dire form / Catched by contagion, like in 
punishment / As in their crime' (PL, X, 543-5)" (219). Armitage suggests that here Milton 
is expressing criticism of Cromwell's imperial expansion. Satan, writes Annitage, is "a 
single person 'with monarchal pride / Conscious of highest worth' (PL, II, 428-9) embarking 
upon a risky enterprise in the new world. Cromwell, too, was a single person with quasi-
monarchical powers, in the eyes of republicans" (219). Armitage suggests that Satan is 
conflated with Cromwell, and that this is further evidence of Milton's criticism of the 
Protectorate. This confirms to Armitage that "when Milton began work on Paradise Lost, 
in the last months of the Protectorate, his treatment of the problem of Empire would have 
been a timely reflection on the betrayal of the English republic by Cromwell, an English 
Sulla. When the poem was first published, in 1667, it retained its topicality as a 
retrospective republican reading of the failures of the 1650s" (223). Armitage suggests that 
Milton never faulted republicanism itself, but rather held Cromwell personally responsible 
for the republic's decline. Thus, Annitage concludes that "Milton remained true to his 
republicanism even in his anger and his regret" (225). 
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In Writing the English Republic, David Norbrook also presents the late Milton as a 
republican. He argues, for example, that Paradise Lost transmits Milton's republican 
principles. In challenging the assumption that "Milton's praise of God's kingship over 
Satan's rebellion ... was a return to monarchist imagination" (433), Norbrook argues that 
"in giving a semi-republican rhetoric to Satan," Milton "demonstrates how republican ideals 
can become corrupted by personal ambition" (442). Norbrook claims that during the 
Satanic assembly in Book II, Milton's description reveals that "Satan has been praised" by 
the other fallen angels in a "monarchical way for a pre-eminently republican virtue" (454). 
TIlls suggests to Norbrook that through Satan, Milton was presenting a criticism of 
CromwelPs single-person rule, where the common interest had become subordinate to a 
private will. However, Norbrook writes that "the most important point being made" by 
Milton is that Satan's use of the "language of public interest should not discredit the 
language itself, merely the context in which it becomes the vehicle for tyrannical speech-
acts" (455). In other words, Norbrook argues that Milton uses Satan not to discredit 
republican rhetoric, but its misuse. Norbrook then suggests that repUblicanism is associated 
with Heaven in Paradise Lost, whereas monarchy becomes increasingly associated with 
Satan: "the fallen angels' ability to muster superb quasi-republican eloquence is a sign of 
their heavenly origins. The more time passes from his initial rebellion, the more 
monarchical Satan's language becomes" (455). Norbrook also argues that throughout 
Paradise Lost, a "link is made between monarchy and anarchy" (471). He argues that for 
Milton, "it was monarchy - including Protectoral monarchy - that was Babel-like, 
replacing a common language of public interests with the clashing, atomized languages of 
contending private interests" (469). An example of this is Milton's description of Chaos 
seated on the throne as an Anarch, "a brilliant coinage ... [and] a back-formation from 
'monarch' (ii,988)" (471). When Milton associates Chaos with political disorder, Norbrook 
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says it is to make an anti-monarchist point. These connections that Norbrook sees Milton 
making between Satan, anarchy, and monarchy on the one hand, and divinity and 
republicanism on the other, are also compatible with Norbrook'sviews on Milton's 
cosmology. He writes that "Milton's Chaos is not inherently evil," and that "Chaos is as it 
were the cosmos's [sic] default mode, transformable into concord only by a continued 
process of careful intervention" (472). Norbrook infers that "this cosmology is republican 
in the sense that it plays down any sense of monarchy as a natural order and strongly 
exercises the element of artifice in any polity" (473). Having made this point, Norbrook 
accommodates Milton's God into this cosmology by emphasising his republican credentials 
and downplaying his role as heavenly monarch: 
Milton's God is not frightened by the risk of apparent imbalance; he knows that this 
can be turned into a more complicated and vital kind of balance. . .. In political 
terms, God's role is that of a dynamic, Machiavellian legislator. He is open to 
conflict and discord and does not claim to achieve concord by enforcing sterility. 
While he enjoys the panoply of kingship, he is ready to undergo sacrifice for the 
general good. God's creation of the Son epitomizes the principle of divine 
reduction. (472, 474) 
According to Norbrook, then, Milton associates repUblicanism with God and Heaven, and 
monarchy with Satan and anarchy. He concludes that although Paradise Lost was 
published during the Restoration, "it could still transmit to future generations the republican 
principles that were waiting in their Chaos" (491). 
Besides Paradise Lost, Milton's prose works are cited by critics as evidence of his 
republicanism. For example, Austin Woolrych writes that in Milton's The Ready and Easy 
Way (1660), the "condemnation of monarchy is absolute," and "its general celebration of 
repUblican liberty and virtue in contrast with monarchical tyranny and servitude stands for 
certain above the limitations of time and place" (216, 214). Similarly, Z.S. Fink writes that 
one may conclude from The Ready and Easy Way, "that Milton's experiences with Charles I 
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did more than make him reject kingship, ... they made him reject all single-person 
magistrates whatsoever" (104). More recent Milton scholarship has concurred with these 
interpretations. Blair Worden, for instance, has stated that in 1659-60, Milton 
unambiguously renounced monarchy of all kinds ("Milton and Marchamont" 166). Martin 
Hollis writes that The Ready and Easy Way "denounces monarchy in all its forms and ... 
breathes republican fire" (66). Also with reference to The Ready and Easy Way, Norbrook 
writes that "Milton both practises and preaches a commitment to the power and value of 
republican language," and that "Milton sees kingship as a form of blasphemy" (412, 414). 
This interpretation is supported by Cedric C. Brown, who writes, with reference to The 
Ready and Easy Way, that 
having established its government, Israel had become, in Milton's words, 'a 
Commonwealth of God's own ordaining, he only thir king, they his peculiar people,' 
and Moses' [ sic] asking for help and leading the people was clearly a good thing; 
whereas the desire of subsequent generations of Israelites to have a king is seen as a 
faIling off from that standard of government by senate which God had manifestly 
approved. (50) 
The main issue, argues Brown, "concerns civic freedom and the avoidance of tyranny 
which ... [Milton] thinks inevitably comes with monarchical rule" (52). Brown supports 
this argument by commenting on the changes made by Milton in the second edition of The 
Ready and Easy Way. He writes that although Milton "is more circumspect in his 
definition of the powers of the grand council, . . . he sticks to his perpetual senate of 
aristocratic virtue, and it emerges that replacements will be elected only by a process of 
refinement, keeping choice from the popular voice [for monarchical rule]. Spirits are to 
save the people from themselves and compel them to liberty" (54). Brown concludes that 
the "new passages reinforce the sense of moral difference between republicanism and 
kingly rule" (54). Finally, Quentin Skinner also positions Milton within the republican 
tradition: 
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I have said that the classical republicans were mainly concerned to celebrate ... 
'the excellency of a free state' .... Like a free person, a free state is one that is able 
to act according to its own will. . .. A free state, they argue, must constitutionally 
speaking be what Livy and Sallust and Cicero had all described and celebrated as a 
res publica. . .. Most of the writers I have cited ... generally conclude that, if we 
wish to set up a res publica, it will be best to set up a republic as opposed to any 
kind of principality or monarchical rule. The central contention of the theory I am 
examining is thus that a self-governing republic is the only type of regime under 
which a community can hope to attain greatness at the same time as guaranteeing its 
citizens their individual liberty. This is Machiavelli's usual view, Harrington's 
consistent view, and the view that Milton eventually came to accept [by the time he 
wrote The Ready and Easy Way]. ("Republican Ideal" 301-303) 
Like many of the critics mentioned, Skinner here suggests that the late Milton is a 
republican in the sense of repudiating monarchy and asserting republican forms of 
government. 
In "Milton and the Characteristics Of A Free Commonwealth," Thomas N. Corns 
offers a more qualified argument for presenting Milton as a republican. Corns observes 
that in many of Milton's prose works, Milton neither condemns monarchy nor praises 
republican government. In The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649), for instance, 
Milton "praises good kingship and distinguishes it from the regime of Charles JI' (31). The 
issue in this tract, writes Corns, "is the response appropriate not to monarchs but to tyrantstl 
(30). Similarly, Corns observes that in Eikonoklastes (1649), "kingship as such is not the 
issue: this king and his punishment are" (32). Corns also examines A Defence of the People 
of England (1651), and concludes that here Milton "is defending the rights of a particular 
people at a particular time to deal with the particular king, rather than with the merits of 
republicanism. Indeed, he once more explores the distinction between good kings and 
tyrants, and declines to follow the republican argument to the exclusion ofthe former" (33). 
However, having qualified his argument with these observations, Corns argues that "the 
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republicanism, in Milton's writing, is more an attitude of mind than a particular 
governmental configuration" (41). Corns refers to The Ready and Easy Way as Milton's 
"last major republican pamphlet," and writes that it "offers an image, rendered 
retrospectively poignant, of an English free commonwealth founded on the service of the 
godly ... [and] it produces a rational and unmystical state ... 'where no single person, but 
reason only swaies' (revised edition, CPW, VII, 427)" (41). Corns argues that Milton's 
presentation of kingship, on the other hand, "requires the surrender of self-respect ... [and] 
brings the unacceptable and displaced aesthetic of the court, its assertion of the divine 
status of the king and his family, together with the gaudy corruptions of cavalier culture" 
(41). Corns also refers to Milton's conclusion in The Ready and Easy Way where Milton 
asserts, "What I have spoken, is the language of that which is not call'd amiss the good Old 
Cause" (89S). The phrase, "the good Old Cause," Com claims, "is appropriate for, in a 
sense, that cause, the cause of English republicanism .... It is an idiom in which the value 
system and an aesthetic are inscribed, and it is an undeferential [sic] .posture which utterly 
subverts the assumptions of Stuart monarchism" (42). Corns concludes that "Milton's prose 
articulates something ... [hard] to control, that republican consciousness, founded in a 
sense of political self-worth and a powerful suspicion of the mystery of kingship" (42). 
Thus, although Corns offers a somewhat more qualified argument than many of his 
contemporaries, he nevertheless joins those critics who present Milton as republican. 
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(ii) 
In contrast to those who present Milton as a republican, John Rogers argues that 
Milton's Paradise Lost articulates liberal political theory. In The Matter of Revolution: 
Science, Poetry, and Politics in the Age of Milton, Rogers connects Milton to the 
philosophy of Vitalism, which sought to secure "into the fabric of the physical world a 
general scheme of individual agency and decentralised organisation that we can identifY as 
protoliberalism" (12). It is important to recognise here that Rogers only offers a very vague 
and therefore weak definition of liberal political theory on which to base his judgement of 
Milton's political philosophy in Paradise Lost. According to Rogers, the cornerstone of 
Milton's theodicy is reflected in the belief that God initially infused his divine goodness 
into matter, and that thereafter matter can safely be trusted to govern itself Thus, Rogers 
explains that in Paradise Lost, "the process by which 'order from disorder sprung' (3.713) 
was set in motion by an unrepeatable originary [sic] act that empowered the world's 
material mould to alter itself; once the abyss has been impregnated with the self-activating 
divina virtus, the effective control over generation evolves on the now self-generating 
matter of chaos" (114). To demonstrate his point, Rogers uses Raphael's description of the 
earth's formation: 
The Earth was form'd, but in the Womb as yet 
Of Waters, Embryon immatnre involv'd, 
Appear'd not: over all the face of Earth 
Main Ocean flow'd, not idle, but with warm 
Prolific humor soft'ning all her Globe, 
Fermented the great Mother to conceive, 
Satiate with genial moistnre, when God said, 
Be gather'd now ye Waters under Heav'n 
Into one place, and let dry Land appear. (7. 276-84) 
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Although he admits that "in the final lines of this passage, Milton dutifully reproduces 
God's commandment in Genesis," Rogers nevertheless asserts that "nowhere does Milton 
more dramatically wrest from God his creative agency" (115, 114). Rogers explains that 
this passage describes "the moment at which the earth gave birth to itself' (115). This idea 
of autonomous material generation has powerful political ramifications. Once infused with 
divine goodness and power, all matter can govern itself according to the intrinsic laws of 
nature. 
Rogers therefore argues that natural law philosophy is present throughout Milton's 
Paradise Lost. He observes that not even God, in Paradise Lost, is above the law of nature. 
After Adam and Eve sin, "the Father accepts the Son's sacrifice and promises that man will 
indeed be saved; but the Father then qualifies his offer of redemption with the following 
condition" (147): 
But longer in that Paradise to dwell, 
The Law I gave to Nature him forbids: 
Those pure immortal Elements that know 
No gross, no unharmonious mixture foul, 
Eject him tainted now, and purge him off 
As a distemper, gross to air as gross, 
And mortal food, as may dispose him best 
For dissolution wrought by Sin, that first 
Distemper'd all things, and of incorrupt 
Corrupted. (11.48-57) 
"In explaining to the Son the limitations of his mercy ... the Father describes what will be 
the necessary expulsion of Adam and Eve from the garden" (148). Rogers explains that 
although the Father leads us to understand that he would like to pardon fully the sinful pair, 
"the laws of nature established at the Creation prohibited man's further habitation in the 
garden. . .. He justifies what might otherwise appear to be a callous lack of mercy by an 
appeal to an even higher principle of irrevocable natural law" (148). The expulsion is 
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represented by the Father "as a lamentable reaction of the material body of Paradise to the 
newly corrupted bodies of Adam and Eve .... By reason of the vital spirit infused at the 
Creation into the original matter, material processes exercise their own highly moral form 
of justice as they follow inexorably the laws of nature the Father has established" (148-
149). 
However, when the Father announces his intentions to the entire heavenly 
community, an entirely new rationale for the deportation of Adam and Eve is presented: 
Lest therefore his now bolder hand 
Reach also ofthe Tree of Life, and eat, 
And live for ever, dream at least to live 
For ever, to remove him I decree, 
And send him from the Garden forth to Till 
The Ground whence he was taken, fitter soil. (11.93-98) 
It now appears as though the Father had played an active role in the pair's punishment: 
UMilton's Father emerges as the stem lawgiver, actively intervening to execute punishment" 
(152). After "the poem's first, naturalistic explanation of the expulsion" resulting from "an 
absolute but impersonal natural justice,U Rogers argues that "the remainder of the epic 
focuses on the retributive justice of an anthropomorphised deity" (151). Moreover, 
although Michael initially attributes tyrannical rule to sinful human desire, as his 
explanation continues "he quickly lifts his attribution of cause from this human, 
psychological plane to the supernal stratum ofthe anger of a vengeful God" (162): 
Therefore since hee permits 
Within himself unworthy Powers to reign 
Over free Reason, God in Judgement just 
Subjects him from without to violent Lords. (12.90-93) 
Thus, "Michael himself envisions history as a form of God's retributive justice" (160). 
However, Rogers argues that Michael's "relentless delineation of an authoritarian 
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philosophy of organisation" does not quite overwhelm "the poem's attempt to engender a 
discourse of liberal individualism" (161). He describes the disciplinary process, whereby 
God punishes those who transgress Mosaic law, as "one of systemic liberalisation" (170). 
He explains that 
it is intended to move man, considered both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, 
'From imposition of strict Laws, to free / Acceptance of large Grace' (12.304-5), a 
movement away from divine intervention and toward a world of human choice and 
voluntaty acceptance of help from above. . .. fusofar as Michael is functioning as a 
Mosaic lawgiver to Adam, his description of the law as 'imperfect' or incomplete 
announces the planned obsolescence of his own historical discourse. The Mosaic 
law exists to be abrogated. (170) 
Throughout history, God has judged and punished those who have not obeyed his 
commands so that as free agents humans will learn to depend on the regularity of natural 
law. Rogers claims that this interpretation is supported by the poem's representation of the 
actual expulsion: 
The Cherubim descended; on the ground 
Gliding meteorous, as Ev'ning Mist 
Ris'n from a River o'er the Marish glides 
And gathers ground fast at the Labourer's heel, 
Homeward returning. (12.628-32) 
The image of the mist in this passage, that "gathers ground fast at the Labourer's heel," 
suggests to Rogers that it is "this mist itself that dogs the labourer's step and pushes him to 
his appointed end. In making this force a vaporous propulsion . .. Milton surrounds this 
prod at the labourer's heel with an interpretive [sic] penumbra that leaves indeterminate the 
controlling cause of human action" (172-173). Rogers concludes that "the image of the 
mist reasserts the vitalist world of ordinary providence, the animistic cosmos in which God 
exerts his control over man not with arbitrary judgements but more simply by placing him 
among those pre-established natural laws that foster liberal justice" (173-174). In 
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accordance with his weak definition of liberalism, Rogers suggests that Milton is an 
advocate of liberal political theory because the presence of natural law theory is observed 
by Rogers in Paradise Lost. 
In her book, Early Modern Liberalism, Annabel Patterson also positions Milton 
firmly within the tradition of liberal political philosophy. Like Rogers, however, she offers 
a vague, one-line definition of liberalism. She defines it as the "political thoughts that 
follow from the claim that all human beings are naturally equal, and have therefore equal 
rights," and she identifies "John Milton as an example of an early modem liberal" (1, 63). 
Because of Milton's promotion of the freedom of the press in Areopagitica (1644), 
Patterson writes that it is "Milton's most inarguably liberal pamphlet" (9) and "became a 
canonical text of modem liberalism" (64). In Of Education (1644), Milton asserts the need 
of young commonwealthmen to acquire a liberal education, which "in 1644 could be 
designed only in a free society, politically speaking" (62). Patterson argues that in order to 
secure such a society, in his Second Defence of the English People (May, 1654), Milton 
advised Cromwell to incorporate into his regime aspects of liberal political thought. For 
example, she writes that Milton declared to Cromwell "that the new regime should 'leave 
the church to the Church;' that is to say, initiate that legal and financial separation of church 
and state on which John Locke put so much seemingly inventive emphasis" (63). 
Moreover, she writes that Milton also asserts the needs "of education and freedom of 
speech" in this pamphlet (63). When Patterson examines Milton's argument in The Ready 
and Easy Way (1660), she acknowledges its "inconsistencies and eruptions of bias," but 
nevertheless argues that it represents early modem liberal political thought. She states that 
"if one wants to see how early modem liberalism was conceived by one of its pioneers (at 
one of the most inventive because desperate stages of his thinking), one can hardly do 
better than tum to the final pages of Milton's appeal, in the spring of 1660, to the English 
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nation to remain a republic of sorts, by refusing to accept the house of Stuart back at the 
head of their government" (24,5). She points out that the proposals made by Milton in this 
pamphlet, to preserve the ideals of the revolution, are centred around his desire for liberty 
of conscience and the protection of civil rights. 
Although Patterson briefly attends to some of Milton's political prose, her argument 
centres on Milton's sonnets, which she sees "as a key, once almost lost or at least pocketed, 
to Milton's understanding of himself as an early modem liberal" (67). She states that "the 
story that Milton made his sonnets tell was indeed that of the 'ongoing fight against 
barbarity,' but we learn of the defeats in that campaign as much or more than the victories" 
(70). The sonnets in Milton's personal 'Cambridge' manuscript "all carried at some stage in 
his thinking manuscript titles that stated or implied a precise dating" (72). The manuscript 
titles reveal that sonnet 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 were all written between 1642 and 
1652, during the Civil War and interregnum. Yet when these sonnets were published 
during the Restoration in 1673, Milton had removed their temporal markers of historic 
specificity so that the overt signs of his political life as an opponent of the tyranny of 
Charles I were removed. Patterson suggests that Milton's sonnets supported liberal political 
action against the barbarity of Charles I, but Milton knew that it was necessary to disguise 
this aspect of his sonnets when he published them during the reign of Charles II. 
According to Patterson, this evidence confirms Milton's understanding of himself as an 
early modem liberal. For Patterson, Milton's wanting to hide his revolutionary past (like 
everyone else), is evidence of his liberalism. She concludes, therefore, that "the advantages 
of designating Milton an early modem liberal are many. Not least among them is the 
opportunity it gives for reducing the disagreements among Milton's readers, and even for 
expanding their number" (65). Furthermore, she states that "a liberal Milton can own more 
his own works" (65): 
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the right to express one's opinions in public is asserted implicitly in every one of his 
tracts merely by their appearance; but Milton also explored that right explicitly in 
several of his S01ll1ets. The right to practise the religion of one's choice (though the 
right to practise none would have been inconceivable to him) drives Lycidas and the 
S01ll1et on the Piedmont massacre as much as it informs the prospectus of church 
history at the end of Paradise Lost. And as for the right to education and 
information, there are few writers who have so consistently demonstrated the belief 
in its importance. (66) 
Clearly, Patterson believes that Milton is best presented as an early modem liberal. 
(iii) 
Some critics, then, identify Milton as a republican, and others consider him a 
liberal, but a problem arises when we take into account the findings of prominent political 
historians who reveal that republican political thought is distinct from liberal political 
thought. In "The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty," Quentin Ski1ll1er, for example, 
investigates republicanism with particular emphasis on the works of Machiavelli. 
According to Skinner, republicans such as Machiavelli believed that the establishment of a 
free state could produce civic greatness and wealth and that only free states are capable of 
bequeathing personal liberty to its citizens. In order to establish a free state, the republicans 
generally conclude that "it will be best to set up a republic II (303). However, a self-
governing republic can only be maintained "if its citizens cultivate that crucial quality 
which Cicero had described as virtus" (303). Skinner explains that this term is "used to 
denote the range of capacities that each one of us as a citizen most needs to possess: the 
capacities that enable us willingly to serve the common good, thereby to uphold the 
freedom of the community, and in consequence to ensure its rise to greatness as well as our 
own individual liberty" (303). It is therefore in the best interest of the citizen to act 
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virtuously because by doing so he serves the state and works to secure his own personal 
liberty. Although it is in the citizen's best interest to serve his state, Skinner says that 
Machiavelli and other republican writers depended upon the law to coerce citizens into 
acting virtuously and fulfilling their civic duties. It is at this point in his argument that 
Skinner examines the differences between republican theory and liberal political theory. 
He states that for theorists such as Machiavelli, "the law preserves our liberty not merely by 
coercing others, but also by directly coercing each one of us into acting in a particular way. 
The law is also used, that is, to force us out of the habitual patterns of self-interested 
behaviour, to force us into discharging the full range of our civic duties, and thereby to 
ensure that the free state on which our own liberty depends is itself maintained free of 
servitude" (305). By contrast, for theorists like Locke who belong to a tradition of liberal 
political thought, 
our freedom is a natural possession, a property of ourselves. The law's claim to 
limit its exercise can only be justified if it can be shown that, were the law to be 
withdrawn, the effect would not in fact be a greater liberty, but rather a diminution 
of the security with which our existing liberty is enjoyed. For a writer like 
Machiavelli, however, the justification oflaw is nothing to do with the protection of 
individual rights, a concept that makes no appearance in the The Discourse at all. 
(305) 
Skinner reaches the conclusion that republican writers "not only connect social freedom 
with self-government, but also link the idea of personal liberty with that of virtuous public 
service," a theory which "contrasts sharply with modem liberal individualism" (306). 
This view is supported by J. G. A. Pocock in his book Virtue, Commerce, and 
Hist01Y. In the essay, "Virtues, Rights, and Manners," he recognises crucial differences 
between liberal juridical and classical republican political thought. He begins with the 
observation that although classical works on the history of political thought are "organized 
to a very high degree around notions of God, nature, and law," there are thinkers such as 
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"Machiavelli, [who] bear no relation to the natural law paradigm" and are therefore 
"presumed to have been negating or subverting it. Changes in the dominant styles of 
political thought are brought within the paradigm and treated as evidence of its destruction 
from without or its exhaustion from without, little attention being paid to the possibility that 
perhaps they did not belong with it in the fIrst place" (37-38). Pocock writes that 
recently, however - and in pursuit of a now prevalent technique of discovering and 
recapitulating the vocabularies and idioms in which political thought has been 
articulated in the course of its history there have arisen presentations of that 
history in which the natural-law paradigm occupies only part of the stage, and we 
learn to speak in idioms not reducible to the conjoined languages of philosophy and 
jurisprudence. . .. The central occurrence in this recent historiography has been the 
crucial role accorded to what is variously termed civic humanism or classical 
republicanism. (38) 
According to Pocock, this vocabulary of classical republicanism is "outstandingly 
discontinuous" with that of juristic discourse (39). He writes that "Francisco Guicciardini, 
for example, was a doctor of civil law and had practised as such; yet in his writings the 
language of republican virtue is regularly if self-destructively employed, while the language 
of jurisprudence hardly ever appears, least of all as a tool of normative political theory. 
Something very similar may be said of Machiavelli" (39). Pocock explains that according 
to republican political theory, humans are constituted in such a way that they are only 
"completed" when they participate in political life for the public good (40). In devoting 
himself in this way to the public good, the citizen is said to embody "virtue." The level of 
authority a particular citizen has in his society will depend upon how virtuous he is by 
nature. Thus, writes Pocock, although "nature may be developed," it "cannot be 
distributed" (43). He concludes that !lvirtue cannot therefore be reduced to matter of right II 
(43). Under republican political theory, then, a citizen's political participation and authority 
are not a given natural right, but are dependent upon his ability to be virtuous. Juridical 
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liberal discourse, on the other hand, "distinguished between libertas and imperium, freedom 
and authority, individuality and sovereignty, private and public. This is its greatest role in 
the history of political thought, and it performs this role by associating liberty with right" 
(40). Pocock explains that under this liberal political theory, 
the civil and common law define individuals as possessors by investing them with 
right and property in things, and ultimately (as with Locke) in themselves .... The 
classical history of what we have come to term liberalism, [is] the story of how 
rights became the precondition, the occasion, and the effective cause of sovereignty, 
so that sovereignty appeared to be the creature of the rights it existed to protect. 
(45) 
Unlike republican political thought, "the liberal synthesis . . . defined the individual as 
right-bearer and proprietor, it did not define him as possessing a personality adequate to 
participation in self-rulell (45). Pocock concludes "that alongside the history of liberalism, 
which is a matter of law and right, there existed throughout the early modem period a 
history of republican humanism, in which personality was considered in terms of virtue" 
(45). Thus, like Skinner, Pocock emphasises the distinction between liberalism and 
republicanism. 
This distinction is also made clear by Gordon J. Schochet, who writes that in 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England, "the discourse of virtue, which was part of 
republican theory, stood alongside a legalistic discourse of individual rights and liberties" 
(328). During the seventeenth century, legalistic and rights terminology began to compete 
with humanist rhetoric and, by the end of the eighteenth century, it became the more 
dominant discourse: "for the most part, after the French and American revolutions, the 
vocabularies of virtue and corruption and of civility and politeness were to play diminished 
roles in politics" (331). By 1800, "the principal terms of twentieth-century English-
language politics were in place" and, although "the meaning of these terms has shifted 
somewhat over the intervening 200 years," they "comprised the more-or-Iess coherent body 
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of doctrine that would come to be known as 'liberalism'" (333). Schochet points out that 
the triumph ofliberalism has coincided with the defeat of republicanism: 
The legal construct 'state' eventually replaced the more humanistic 'commonwealth,' 
and its members were 'citizens' in the modem sense whose 'rights,' 'interest,' 
'properties,' and 'liberties' were the reasons for political action as well as limitations 
on public 'authority.' The point of politics was to protect and enhance rights and 
liberties - which were now conceived as entitlements that preceded organised 
politics and government rather than as privileges which were their creations and 
not to pursue civic virtue. (333) 
Like Skinner and Pocock, then, Schochet points to fundamental differences between liberal 
and republican political thought. 
(iv) 
Given that republican political theory is fundamentally distinct from liberal political 
theory, as Skinner, Pocock, and Schochet point out, the question must be asked: how can 
Milton be both a liberal and a republican? In this thesis, I propose to contribute to the 
answer to this question by considering Milton's A Treatise Of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical 
Causes (1659) and The Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth (second 
edition, April, 1660). In Chapter Two, a comprehensive study of liberalism will be 
presented with reference to John Locke's late political thought, so that an accurate 
comparison can be made between liberal political thought and Milton's political thought in 
Of Civil Power. Like Locke, Milton promotes religious toleration and the separation of 
church and state. Moreover, he asserts that the state can legitimately use force in civil 
matters and that the church can legitimately use persuasion in religious matters. The 
investigation of liberalism will then be refined and extended, based on William Walker's 
finding that Locke's theory of religious toleration is limited. Milton's theory of religious 
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toleration is also limited, and he ends up asserting, like Locke, that Catholics should not be 
tolerated by the state. There are, therefore, strong grounds for thinking of Milton as a 
liberal in Of Civil Power. But there are no grounds for thinking of Milton as a republican 
in this treatise. 
In Chapter Three, The Ready and Easy Way will be examined in relation to 
republican and liberal political thought. A comprehensive study of republicanism will be 
presented, based on the work of both Pocock and Skinner. Milton's political thought in this 
tract conforms with republicanism in a number of ways: he argues that republican 
government will bring civic greatness and will promote liberty; he at times emphasises the 
importance of serving the state; he suggests that citizens will need to cultivate the virtues in 
order to construct and maintain republican government; and he criticises monarchy. 
However, Milton's republicanism in The Ready and Easy Way is qualified in several ways: 
first, because the reasons Milton expresses for opposing monarchy are often different from 
those cited by Machiavelli, and second, because Milton's repudiation of monarchy is by no 
means absolute (at one point in the text he applauds monarchy where Christ is king, and in 
other places he admits that monarchy is not necessarily a bad form of govenllnent). Thus, 
these factors qualifY the sense in which Milton is a republican in The Ready and Easy Way. 
Next, Milton's political thought in The Ready and Easy Way will be compared with 
Lockean liberalism. In parts of this tract, Milton asserts, like Locke, that man was created 
free, man is naturally free, and that government should protect Man's freedom. Moreover, 
he suggests that government base its laws on the laws of nature. For Milton, as for Locke, 
one of these laws of nature is that all humans remain free. Milton's priorities are also 
consistent with liberal political thought because, like Locke, he defends religious toleration 
and argues that there is nothing more important than religious freedom. Milton's political 
thought also conforms with liberalism, in the sense that he suggests that rebellion is 
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justified if government violates the people's liberties, he expresses a Christian view of 
history, and he asserts that government originates in the consent of the people. However, 
Milton also diverges from Lockean liberalism in a number important ways. Unlike Locke, 
Milton criticises the rule of the majority and presents a very narrow definition of "the 
people" who can choose the form and composition of England's government at this time. 
Milton's political thought in The Ready and Easy Way is thus both consistent and 
inconsistent in a number of ways with both republican and liberal political thought. But 
this tract is more liberal than republican because the liberal notion that humans have a God-
given natural freedom that government must protect, is more prominent in this pamphlet 
than the republican notion that personal freedom is a privilege that must be earned. Like 
Locke, Milton also defends religious freedom and emphasises its importance, and he never 
expresses the republican notion of religion as a mere political tool. Moreover, in 
accordance with his Protestantism, Milton also expresses a linear Christian view of history, 
which contrasts with Machiavelli's cyclical view of history. Overall, then, Milton is more 
ofa liberal than a republican in The Ready and Easy Way. 
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2. THE CHURCH, THE STATE, AND TOLERATION: 
MILTON'S OF CIVIL POWER 
(i) 
Although we do not know exactly when Of Civil Power was published, Austin 
Woolrych infonns us that Milton "registered it for publication with the Stationers' 
Company on February 16, 1659" (46). Up to and during this time England experienced 
political instability. Between 1642 and 1649, civil war had plagued the country, with those 
loyal to King Charles I fighting those who believed him to be a tyrant and a traitor with 
Catholic connections. The war ended with the public trial and execution of Charles and the 
abolition of monarchy and the House of Lords. After a period of parliamentary rule, in 
1653 the army, unhappy with the Rump Parliament's failure to institute the religious 
refonns that would allow for liberty of conscience, forced the dissolution of the Rump 
Parliament and in its place established the Protectorate under Oliver Cromwell. After the 
death of Oliver Cromwell in 1658, his son Richard was made Protector, and on January 27, 
1659 he summoned a new Parliament. 
Milton's Of Civil Power is addressed to this Parliament: "I have prepared, supreme 
Council, against the much expected time of your sitting, this Treatise" (Complete Poems 
and Major Prose 839). In his introduction, Milton recommends that the members of this 
Parliament only concern themselves with civil matters and that they leave ecclesiastical 
matters to the church: "the civil only to your proper care, ecclesiastical to them only from 
who it takes both that name and nature" (839). Milton asks them "to regard other men's 
consciences, as you would your own [if] ... in the power of others" (839). Thus, the 
argument in Of Civil Power is designed to convince Parliament not to use force in matters 
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of religion. This argument is intimately tied to the fact that, as Arthur Barker writes, "the 
course of events had convinced him that no peaceful settlement could be achieved until the 
ecclesiastical and the political were rigorously separated" (224). There are, however, 
several problems with Milton's argument, problems that render his theory of religious 
toleration extremely narrow in scope. Once we have completed a comprehensive study of 
what constitutes "liberalism," we can see that this theory of limited religious toleration 
aligns Milton in many important respects with liberal political thought. 
(li) 
Though John Locke participates in the longer tradition of juridical thought, and 
though, as Richard Ashcraft has shown, he is also a Whig ideologist, Locke may still 
legitimately be regarded as having presented a definitive statement of liberal political 
thought.! First, it is important to understand that Locke's political theory is founded on his 
religious beliefs.2 As Locke says in A Letter Concerning Toleration (1685), "the taking 
I Ashcraft writes that "Locke's thought expresses the tension within liberalism as a social theory between its 
universalistic claims to moral and religious equality -liberty, equality and fraternity - and its 
instrumentalist treatment of human beings as part of the process of capital accumulation .... The bifurcation 
between the radical assertions of moral worth and the indifference to the socio-economic suffering of the 
individual that characterizes Locke's political thought reappears as a constant tension within the political 
theories ofliberals since the seventeenth century. The distribution of emphasis between these two 
dimensions, the specific concerns of the theorist and his ordering of value preferences and methodological 
assumptions, and the empirical social problems to which the political theory is addressed vary from one 
liberal thinker to another, but there is, I believe, a radical-conservative dichotomy at the heart ofliberal 
political theory. In supplying the first comprehensive statement of this social, economic and political 
perspective, Locke may truly be said to be the father of liberalism" (Locke'S Two Treatises of Government 
265). 
2 Some critics suggest that Locke's liberalism is purely secular in origin. For example, Stephen Zwicker 
claims that there was a "disengagement of politics from religion" over the course of the seventeenth century 
and, as an example, he says that "Locke composed the second Exclusion Crisis Treatise in a language ... 
wholly devoid of religious rhetoric" (Lines of Authority 234). Similarly, C. B. MacPherson separates Locke's 
political thought from religion, claiming that Locke sought to erase "the moral disability with which unlimited 
capitalist appropriation had hitherto been handicapped" (221). However, these interpretations have been 
challenged by John Dunn, Richard Ashcraft, and Quentin Skinner. In arguing against MacPherson, Dunn 
connects Locke's political theory to the Protestant doctrine of the calling, and writes that "the liberties which 
he struggles to vindicate are not the socially unavailable and in his eyes morally perilous liberties of 
unrestricted physical indulgence, but those freedoms which are necessary for executing the responsibilities of 
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away of God; though but even in thought, dissolves all" (John Locke: Political Writings 
426). This is in part due to the fact that the law of nature, to which humanity is 
accountable, is the manifestation of God's will. In his major political work, Two Treatises 
of Government (1690), Locke claims that this law of nature dictates that all humans are 
obligated to preserve themselves and, as much as possible, everyone else, and that all 
humans are equal and have the rights to live and be free. In refuting Robert Filmer's claim, 
that the king's absolute authority is a divine right passed on through Adam's heirs, Locke 
first makes the point that God did not give the world just to Adam, but rather to all men: 
"'tis very clear that God, as King David says (Psalm 115.16), 'has given the earth to the 
children of men,' given it to mankind in cornmon" (John Locke: Political Writings 273). 
Next, Locke argues that because all men are equal as God's workmanship and are His 
property, no one has the right to destroy himself or anyone else: 
For men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise maker, all 
the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order and about his 
business, they are his property whose workmanship they are, made to last during 
his, not one another's, pleasure. And being furnished with like faculties, sharing all 
in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination 
among us that may auth0l1ze us to destroy one another. . .. Everyone, as he is 
bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason . 
. . ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind. (264). 
According to Locke, the world belongs to all mankind "in cornmon," not just to Adam and 
his heirs, and all humans are God's servants and God's property. As such, humans are 
obligated to preserve themselves and, as much as they can, everyone else. Ashcraft 
the calling" (245). Dunn rightly concludes that "the secular 'Lockean' liberals of the contemporary United 
States are more intimately than they realise the heirs of the egalitarian promise of Calvinism" (250). The 
connection between religion and Locke's political thought is also observed by Ashcraft, who writes that "the 
architectonic importance of theology ... is a constant feature of Locke's thought. . .. The nature and role of 
God are essential to an understanding of his social and political ideas" (Locke'S Two Treatises of Government 
35, 36). Similarly, Skinner also recognises this aspect of Lockean liberalism and writes, "John Locke's Two 
Treatises of Government [is] the classic text of radical Calvinist politics" (The Foundations of Modern 
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explains, in Locke's Two Treatises of Government, that "Locke is attempting to show ... 
that there is a moral standard that God has given to individuals in their natural condition 
prohibiting them from taking any action that would harm another individual" (101). Locke 
concludes that all humans "by nature are equal" (287), all humans have the "right of self-
preservation" (266), and the "natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power 
on earth" (272). 
Locke also asserts that natural law dictates that all humans have the natural right to 
own assets. He argues that although God gave the world to all mankind, He also made man 
with "a strong desire for self-preservation" and instructed him to labour. To make this 
point, Locke frequently refers to chapter three of Genesis. For example, he quotes verse 19 
and comments that Adam is told by God that "as long as thou livest, shalt thou live by thy 
labour" (243). Locke informs his readers "that these words are not spoken personally to 
Adam, but in him, as a representative, to all mankind, this being a curse upon mankind, 
because of the fall" (243). Nevertheless, Locke argues that by using his God-given ability 
to reason, man can determine that the work an individual puts into the production of a piece 
ofland to nourish himself, makes this land his property: "His labour hath taken it out of the 
hands of nature, where it was common, and belonged equally to all her children, and hath 
thereby appropriated it to himself' (275). Therefore, as well as having the right to live and 
be free, Locke also asserts that every person has the right to own assets. 
According to Locke, then, God's will has provided mankind with a natural law by 
which individuals have the natural rights to life, liberty, and assets. Locke writes that if, in 
the state of nature, this natural law is violated, "the innocent party has the right to destroy 
the other whenever he can until the aggressor offers peace and desires reconciliation on 
such terms as may repair any wrongs he has already done, and secure the innocent for the 
Political Thought 239). As I will show, recognising this link with religion is crucial to understanding Locke's 
political thought, and its relationship with Milton's Protestant political thought. 
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future" (271). Furthermore, Locke argues that when such a violation occurs in the state of 
nature, it is an offence against all mankind and therefore "everyone has a right to punish the 
transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation" (264). If the offender 
has committed murder then every man in the state of nature is authorised to kill him. 
However, a lesser breach of the law of nature should only be punished "to the degree that, 
and with so much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him 
cause to repent, and terrifY others from doing the like" (267). Thus, everyone in the state of 
nature also has this right to punish transgressors of the law of nature. 
Government is established to remedy the problems for man in the state of nature and 
protect the individual's property rights. The problem of man in the state of nature, writes 
Locke, is that "everyone has the executive power of the law of nature," (267) and therefore 
the punishment of a breach of this law will be biased. Where man lives in the state of 
nature, there is no impartial judge available on earth to determine the appropriate sentence 
of a breach of natural law . Locke explains that "it is unreasonable for men to be the judges 
in their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends. 
And, on the other side, that ill-nature, passion, and revenge will carry them too far in 
punishing others" (267). Even if there was an impartial judge, there would still be no 
authority available with the power to execute the appropriate sentence to someone who 
breaks natural law. This is why Locke says that the state of man in nature is very insecure. 
Though man in the state of nature has equal natural rights, Locke explains that the 
enjoyment of these rights is limited by the constant exposure to the invasion of others: "For 
all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers 
of equality and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in the state of nature is very 
unsafe" (324). Locke concludes that these problems of man in the state of nature cause 
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"nothing but confusion and disorder" (267). Because the state of nature "is full of fears and 
continual dangers," Locke writes that men are "willing to quit this condition" and 
join in society with others who are already united, or have of mind to unite, for the 
mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general 
name property. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into 
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of 
their property. (324-325) 
Essentially, then, the purpose of government, according to Locke, is to protect the 
individual's natural property rights. 
However, Locke argues that by leaving the state of nature and entering into 
political society, men surrender some of their natural rights to government. Locke explains 
that no political society can exist unless it has the power to preserve property, and to 
accomplish this it must have the power to punish those who violate its established rules. 
But to make sure punishment is executed without bias, "all private judgement of every 
particular member" of the political society must be "excluded" (304). Locke writes that 
instead of private judgement, 
the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent and the 
same to all parties; and, by men having authority from the community for the 
execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any 
members of that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences 
which any member hath committed against the society with such penalties as the 
law has established. (304) 
Locke concludes, therefore, that by leaving the state of nature and entering into political 
society, the individual relinquishes two of his natural rights. First, the power "of doing 
whatsoever he thought fit for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives 
up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself 
and the rest of that society shall require "(326). Secondly, "the power of punishing he 
wholly gives up, and engages his natural force (which he might before employ in the 
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execution of the law of nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit) to assist the 
executive power of the society, as the law thereof shall require" (326). Thus, according to 
Locke, once an individual enters into political society, he no longer has the right to preserve 
himself and others in the way that he personally thinks is best, nor does he have the right to 
personally judge and punish transgressors of the law in the way that he thinks is best. 
These particular natural rights he entrusts to his government, so that his individual property 
rights, and the property rights of all the members of his political community, will be 
protected. 
In accordance with his belief that all humans have a natural right to be free, Locke 
asserts that government is only established through the consent of the people. He argues 
that every man is free to choose whether or not he joins a particular political society: "no 
man can be put out of his estate and subjected to the political power of another without his 
own consent" (309). This means, as Richard Ashcraft explains, that "for Locke, . . . 
political authority can be conveyed by one individual to another only through the 
mechanism of consent" (Locke's Two Treatises 92). Locke argues that once a man consents 
to join a political society, he "puts himself under an obligation to everyone ofthat society to 
submit to the determination of the majority," unless the members of the political society 
"expressly agreed in any number greater than the majority" (310, 311). Although what 
constitutes a "the majority" here is, as Richard Ashcraft explains, "not ... unequivocally 
clear," I agree with Ashcraft's conclusion that "all men, upon entering into political society, 
are assumed by Locke to be able to exercise their natural right of suffrage" (Revolutionary 
583-584, emphasis added). All men, therefore, after consenting to join a political society, 
have the freedom to vote in an election where the majority of votes will determine what 
form of government the political society will establish: 
the majority having ... the whole power of the community naturally in them, ... 
may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men, and their 
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heirs or successors. . .. Or else into the hands of one man, and then it is a 
monarchy; if to him and his heirs, it is an hereditary monarchy; if to him only for 
life, but upon his death the power only of nominating a successor to return to them, 
an elective monarchy. (327) 
Ashcraft is correct, then, in stating that "Locke is committed to the view that the majority of 
the community may dispose of their political power as they see fit" (Revolutionmy 183). 
However, although "the majority" in a political community has the power to decide what 
form of government shall exist, Locke makes it clear that he does not consider absolute 
monarchy to be a form of government: 
I desire to know what kind of government that is ... where one man commanding a 
multitude has the liberty ... [to] do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without 
the least liberty to anyone to question or control those to execute his pleasure? ... 
What [deJfence is there in such a state against the violence and oppression of this 
absolute ruler, the very question can scarce be born. They are ready to tell you that 
it deserves death only to ask. (267,307) 
As Ashcraft explains, "Locke maintains that, according to natural law, no one can consent 
to the despotical, absolute or arbitrary rule of one man - which is his definition of absolute 
monarchy" (Locke's Two Treatises 155). In Locke's opinion, writes Ashcraft, "absolute 
monarchy ... is no form of government at all" (Locke'S Two Treatises 118). Locke argues, 
therefore, that government is only established through the consent of the people, but the 
people cannot consent to form an absolute monarchy because it is not a form of 
government. 
The right to rebel against an unlawful government is another important aspect of 
Lockean liberalism. In Two Treatises of Government, Locke claims that a government has 
failed to fulfil its purpose and uses force without lawful authority if the legislative power is 
altered without the consent of the people, if the executive power fails to enforce the law, or 
if the actions of the legislative or executive power are contrary to the trust placed in them 
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by the people to preserve, as much as possible, the properties which belong to members of 
the community. Locke argues, first, that "the people shall ... judge" whether or not the 
actions of the legislative or executive power are contrary to the trust placed in them, and 
second, in accordance with his Christian view of history, that "where there is no judicature 
on earth to decide controversies amongst men, God in heaven is judge" (386). If 
government fails to fulfil its purpose and uses force without lawful authority, Locke argues 
that it is then dissolved and ceases to be a legitimate authority. Those previously under its 
authority return to the state of nature and the rights that the people entrusted to government 
are returned to them. Thus, they again have the right to preserve themselves and everyone 
else in the way that they think is best, and they have a right to judge and punish offenders 
of the law of nature. Furthermore, a state of war is the consequence of using force without 
lawful authority: "whosoever uses force without right, as everyone does in society who 
does it without law, puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he so uses it; 
and in that state all former ties are cancelled, all other rights cease, and everyone has the 
right to defend himself, and to resist the aggressor" (379). Locke argues, citing Scripture to 
support his view, that the use of force is a necessary part of defending oneself and resisting 
tyranny: 
thus, notwithstanding whatever title the kings of Assyria had over Judah by the 
sword, God assisted Hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that conquering empire. 
'And the Lord was with Hezekiah and he prospered; wherefore he went forth, and he 
rebelled against the king of Assyria, and served him not' (2 Kings 18 .7). Whence it 
is plain that shaking off a power which force and not right hath set over anyone, 
though it hath the name of rebellion, yet is no offence before God. (362) 
According to Locke, then, people consent to establish government to protect their natural 
property rights, but if government violates these rights or acts without consent and contrary 
to the trust placed in it by the people, it is dissolved and ceases to be a legitimate authority 
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and a state of war arises. The people can then, with God's blessing, use force to resist those 
who fonnerly administered their government. 
Locke also argues that although government may legitimately use force to fulfil its 
purpose, it should never use force in matters of religion. In A Letter Concerning 
Toleration, he writes that in order to punish those that violate any other person's property 
rights, "the magistrate [is] armed with the force and strength of all his subjects" (394). 
However, Locke argues that neither the magistrate, nor anyone else, should use force in 
matters of religion. Although he makes a number of important qualifications to this 
argument which I will examine in section three of this chapter, for now I will examine the 
composition of his argument for religious toleration. In making this argument, Locke finds 
it necessary to distinguish between the Mosaic law and the gospel. In accordance with his 
Christian view of history, he explains that "the commonwealth of the Jews ... was an 
absolute theocracy," (418) and as such there was no difference between church and state: 
The laws established there concerning the worship of one invisible deity were the 
civil laws of that people, and a part of their political government, in which God 
himselfwas the legislator .... The subjects of that government both may and ought 
to be kept in strict conformity with that Church by the civil power. But there is 
absolutely no such thing, under the Gospel, as a Christian commonwealth. (418) 
Locke argues here that the Jews were given their laws by God himself, and therefore their 
civil power had infallible knowledge of God's will and had the right and obligation to use 
force upon those within the commonwealth who violated the law and thus God's will. 
However, under the gospel, such a theocracy does not exist and no one can infallibly 
determine God's will. He writes that there are a "great varieties of ways that men follow" to 
get to heaven, but "it is still doubted which is ... [the] right one" (407). Thus, Locke 
argues that 
the one only narrow way which leads to heaven is not better known to the 
magistrate than to private persons, and therefore I cannot safely take him as my 
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guide, who may probably be as ignorant of the way as myself, and who certainly is 
less concerned for my salvation than I myself am. (408) 
This is one reason why Locke asserts that the state should not force people to worship God 
in a particular way. Similarly, Locke asserts that "the decisions of churchmen, whose 
differences in disputes are sufficiently known, cannot be any sounder, or safer, than [the 
magistrate's]. For there is no infallible judge on earth to determine which church worships 
God the correct way: 
every Church is orthodox to itself; to other, erroneous or heretical. Whatsoever any 
Church believes, it believes to be true; and the contrary thereunto it pronounces to 
be error, So that the controversy between these Churches about the truth of their 
doctrines, and the purity of their worship, is on both sides equal; nor is there any 
judge ... upon earth, by whose sentence it can be determined. (40 I) 
Because there is no infallible judge upon earth to determine which is the best way to 
worship God, "nobody . . . , neither single persons, nor Churches, nay, nor even 
commonwealths, have any just title to invade the civil rights and worldly goods of each 
other, upon pretence of religion" (403). 
Another reason given by Locke for why the state should practice religious 
toleration, is that God now requires humans to have faith in him and the use of force is 
ineffectual at creating this faith. Locke explains that salvation is no longer attained by 
obeying the laws of Moses. Instead, Christ "hath taught men how, by faith and good 
works, they may attain etemallife" (418). Under the gospel, a man's faith in his religious 
practices, his belief that the way he worships God is the right way, is a prerequisite to 
finding salvation: "All the life and power of true religion consists in the inward and :full 
persuasion of the mind; and faith is not faith without believing. . . . Faith only, and inward 
sincerity, are the things that procure acceptance with God" (394,410). But Locke points 
out that the use of force cannot change belief and establish faith: "to believe this or that to 
be true, does not depend upon our will" (420). A man cannot just decide to change what he 
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believes is the best way to worship God because he is threatened with violence or 
persecution: "true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind ... and 
such is the nature of the understanding that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything 
by outward force" (395). The only way to change what a person believes to be true is to 
persuade him that he is wrong: "every man has commission to admonish, exhort, convince 
another of error, and by reasoning to draw him into truth," for "it is only light and evidence 
that can work at changing men's opinions" (395). Locke therefore asserts that even if "the 
magistrate's opinion in religion be sound, and the way that he appoints be truly evangelical, 
"he would still not have the right to force anyone else to worship God in the correct way 
because "fire and sword ... [are not the] proper instruments wherewith to convince men's 
minds of error, and inform them of the truth" (402). So, according to Locke, even if 
infallible judgement in religion was possible under the gospel, the state would still not have 
the right to force people to worship God in the correct way because the use of force is 
ineffectual at changing belief and establishing faith. 
Moreover, Locke argues that using force in matters of religion is not only wrong in 
itself, but also causes others to sin. First, Locke argues that because God now requires us to 
have faith, it is pointless to force a person to perform outward physical acts of worshipping 
God in a particular way if they do not believe that what they are doing is right: 
In a word: whatsoever may be doubtful in religion, yet this at least is certain, that no 
religion which I believe not to be true, can be either true or profitable unto me. In 
vain therefore do princes compel their subjects to come into their Church 
communion, under pretence of saving their souls. If they believe, they will come of 
their own accord; ifthey believe not, their coming will nothing avail them. (410) 
Having presented this proposition, Locke .then argues that performing outward worship 
without faith is not only useless, but offensive to God: 
Whatever profession we make, to whatever outward worship we conform, if we are 
not fully satisfied in our own mind that the one is true, and the other well pleasing 
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unto God, such profession and such practice, far from being any furtherance, are 
indeed great obstacles to our salvation. For in this matter, instead of expiating other 
sins by the exercise of religion, I say in offering thus unto God Almighty such a 
worship as we esteem to be displeasing unto him, we add unto the number of our 
other sins those also of hypocrisy, and contempt of his divine majesty. (394) 
Locke concludes that the 
magistrate has no power to enforce by law . . . the use of any rites or ceremonies 
whatsoever in the worship of God . . . because whatsoever is practised in the 
worship of God is only so far justifiable as it is believed by those who practise it to 
be acceptable unto him. Whatsoever is not done with that assurance of faith, is 
neither well in itself, nor can be acceptable to God. To impose such things, 
therefore, upon any people, contrary to their own judgement, is in effect to 
command them to offend God. (411) 
According to Locke, then, another reason the state should not use force in matters of 
religion is that it is sinful to perform the outward physical acts of worshipping God without 
faith. 
Some of the passages in the Letter, however, suggest that even if infallible 
judgement of God's will was possible under the gospel and the use of force was an effective 
way of establishing faith, it would still be wrong to use force in matters of religion under 
the gospel because religious toleration is agreeable to Christ. Locke writes, for example, 
that Christ never put "the sword into any magistrate's hand, with commission to make use 
of it in forcing men to forsake their former religion, and receive his" (418). Locke argues 
here that Christ does not endorse the use of force in religious matters. To increase those 
who have "faith," Locke recommends that his readers follow Christ's "perfect example, ... 
that prince of peace who sent out his soldiers to the subduing of nations and gathering them 
into his Church, not armed with the sword, or other instruments of force, but prepared with 
the gospel of peace, and with the exemplary holiness of their conversation. This was his 
method" (392-393). Thus, Locke determines that Hno man can be a Christian without 
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charity, and without that faith which works, not by force, but by love" (390). Moreover, he 
writes that 
it is not enough that ecclesiastical men abstain from violence and rapine, and all 
manner of persecution. He that pretends to be a successor of the apostles, and takes 
upon him the office of teaching, is obliged also to admonish his hearers of the duties 
of peace and good-will towards all men; as well ... towards those that differ from 
them in faith and worship. . . . And he ought industriously to exhort all men ... to 
charity, meekness, and toleration. . .. And if anyone that professes himself to be a 
minister of the word of God, a preacher of the Gospel of peace, teach otherwise, he 
either understands not, or neglects, the business of his calling, and shall one day 
give account thereof unto the Prince of Peace. (404) 
Locke asserts that a Christian follows Christ's example and uses love and persuasion, not 
force, to bring people into his church. If a minister of the word of God does not teach 
religious toleration, Locke implies that he will go to hell. He concludes that "toleration of 
those that differ from others in matters of religion is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus 
Christ ... that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind, as not to perceive the necessity 
and advantage of it in so clear a light" (393). So, irrespective of any other reason, Locke 
suggests that the state should tolerate religious differences because this is agreeable to 
Christ. 
In accordance with his argument for religious toleration, Locke determines that 
church and state are separate institutions with distinct functions. The state can legitimately 
use force, but Locke emphasises "that the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only 
to ... civil concernments, and that all civil power, right, and dominion is bounded and 
confined to the only care of promoting these things; and that it neither can nor ought in any 
manner to be extended to the salvation of souls .... No man whatsoever ought therefore to 
be deprived of his terrestrial enjoyments upon account of his religion" (394, 416). So 
although Locke declares that the state can legitimately use force, he stresses that it may 
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only do so to fulfil its purpose, which is to protect the individual's property. Locke 
describes the church, on the other hand, as a "voluntary society of men" who join together 
to worship God "in such a manner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the 
salvation of their souls" (396). He explains that "it is a free and voluntary society," because 
"nobody is born a member of any Church" (396). Everyone is free to join a particular 
church in order to worship God, and everyone is free to leave a particular church if 
afterwards they discover that the church they joined does not worship God in a way that 
they believe is best. According to Locke, this freedom is not compromised by the use of 
persuasion. Thus, to increase membership of their particular church, members can, like 
anyone else, persuade people that their way of worshipping God is the right way: "anyone 
may employ as many exhortations and arguments as he pleases towards the promoting of 
another man's salvation" (421). Once men have consented to form a church, Locke asserts 
that like any society, it needs to "be regulated by some laws, ... the right of making its 
laws can belong to none but the society itself," and "no church is bound by the duty of 
toleration to retain any such person in her bosom as, after admonition, continues obstinately 
to offend against the laws of the society" (397, 399). Locke adds, however, that all 
ecclesiastical laws and acts of discipline within a religious society should 'be designed to 
promote the purpose of religious society, which is to worship God and attain eternal life. 
He therefore concludes that "nothing ought nor can be transacted in the society relating to 
the possession of civil and worldly goods. No force is here to be made use of, upon any 
occasion whatsoever" (399). Thus, although a church can legitimately excommunicate 
those who continue to violate its laws, Locke states that "in all cases care is to be taken that 
the sentence of excommunication, and the execution thereof, carry with it no rough usage, 
of word or action, whereby the ejected person may any wise be damnified in body or 
estate" (400). Unlike the state, the church cannot, under any circumstances, use force. 
Thus, Locke reaffirms that "the Church itself is a thing absolutely separate and distinct· 
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from the Commonwealth" (403). Although Locke grants some exceptions to this claim that 
I will examine in section three, the separation of church and state is an important aspect of 
Lockean liberalism. 
We now have a broad understanding of liberalism, at least as it was formulated by 
Locke. His political philosophy is founded on his Christian religious beliefs and a 
Christian view of history. As Joshua Mitchell observes, "for Locke, human beings stand 
between the beginning with Adam and the redemption at Christ's second coming" (97). 
The Lockean liberal asserts that God has declared his will in the form of natural law, and it 
is only by virtue of this natural law that men in the state of nature have the natural right to 
live, be free, own assets, and judge and punish transgressors of natural Jaw. However, 
because of the insecurities and dangers for man in the state of nature, men unite and form 
government to protect their property. In doing so, they entrust to government their natural 
right to preserve themselves and everyone else in the manner that they think is best, and the 
natural right to judge and punish transgressors of natural law. In aceordance with the belief 
that all humans have the natural right to be free, the liberal also asserts that government is 
only established through the consent of the people. Moreover, the liberal asserts that force 
should not be used in matters of religion, although it is legitimate for anyone to persuade 
another that their way of worshipping God is best. For the liberal, church and state are 
separate institutions with distinct functions. The church can use persuasion, but not force, 
in order to try to save souls. The state, on the other hand, can legitimately use force (and 
persuasion) in order to protect individual property rights. According to the liberal, 
however, if a government fails to protect individual property rights and uses force without 
lawful authority, then it is dissolved, everyone returns to the state of nature, and a state of 
war arises in which the people have the right to defend themselves as they see fit and 
punish their attackers. 
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(ii) 
In Of Civil Power, Milton, like Locke, subscribes to a Christian view of history and 
argues that although church and state were combined under the Mosaic law and the use of 
force was then acceptable in religious matters, an important change has since occurred. 
Milton writes that Moses "did all by immediate divine direction" (845), and that the kings 
of Judah "might, when they pleased, receive an answer from God" (845). Because Moses 
and the kings of Judah received their laws directly from God, they "had a commonwealth .. 
. incorporated with a national church exercised more in bodily than in spiritual worship: so 
as the church might be. called a commonwealth, and the whole commonwealth a church" 
(845). So although these "kings of Judah ... both judged and used force in religion," 
Milton explains that "then was the state of rigour, childhood, bondage, and works, to all 
which force was not unbefitting . . .. The law was then written on tables of stone, and to be 
performed according to the letter, willingly or unwillingly" (848). Milton argues here that 
those who governed before Christ could have direct access to God's will. Those who 
governed with this "immediate divine direction" were thus the infallible judges of God's 
will and therefore had the authority to judge "in all causes, not ecclesiastical only, but civil" 
(849). This means that to fulfil God's will, they could legitimately use force not only in 
civil matters, but also in matters of religion. The only reason Milton presents this 
argument, however, is to convince his readers that an important change has since taken 
place: "our condition changed from legal to evangelical" after "the redemption of our 
Saviour" (851). Milton's explanation of the consequences of this change constitutes the 
crux of his argument against the magistrate's use of force in matters of religion. 
Like Locke, Milton argues that under the gospel no one can infallibly determine 
God's will. He writes that although "the kings of Judah and those magistrates under the law 
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might have recourse, as I said before, to divine inspiration; ... our magistrates under the 
gospel have not, more than to the same spirit, which those whom they force have ofttimes 
in greater measure than themselves II (849). Thus, under the gospel, magistrates no longer 
have direct access to divine direction and are instead reliant on the "same spirit" as 
everyone else. By this, Milton means that magistrates, like everyone else, are reliant on the 
illumination of God's spirit to interpret Holy Scripture correctly. For Milton asserts that 
Holy Scripture is the record of God's will, but to interpret God's will correctly from 
Scripture it is necessary to be illuminated with God's spirit. He states that there is "no other 
divine rule or authority from without us ... but the holy scripture, and no other within us 
but the illumination of the Holy Spirit II (840-41). Barker is therefore correct when he states 
that "the pamphlets of 1659 heavily emphasise Scripture and the Spirit as the only sources 
of faith" (234). However, Milton considers that "no man can know at all times" whether or 
not God's spirit is within him, "much less to be at any time for certain in any other" (841). 
The consequence of never really knowing whether or not God is within us when we 
interpret Scripture is that we can also never know for sure that we have correctly 
interpreted Scripture and God's will. For both Locke and Milton, then, everyone is now 
fallible and no one can claim to know with certainty the will of God. It is for this reason 
that Milton concludes "that no man or body of men in these times can be the infallible 
judges or determiners in matters of religion to any other men's consciences but their own" 
(841). Consequently, Milton argues that under the gospel it is sinful for any person to 
claim infallible knowledge of God's will or to use force in matters of religion. The Pope is 
thus "to all true protestants" the "anti-christ, for that he assumes to himself this infallibility 
over both conscience and the scripture" (841). Moreover, Milton writes that if the 
magistrate, "being himself so often fallible, ... bears the sword" in matters of religion, it is 
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"not in vain only, but unjustly and to evil" (845). Milton therefore argues, like Locke, that 
it is a sin to claim infallible knowledge of God's will or to use force in matters of religion. 
Even if a person has infallible knowledge of God's will, Milton argues that they 
should still not use force in religious matters because God now requires humans to have 
faith in him, and the use of outward force is ineffectual at establishing or spreading this 
faith and instead only increases sin. Under the Mosaic law, people were required by God to 
obey his laws "willingly or unwillingly" (848). Now, however, Milton argues that they 
must be willing: 
For in religion whatever we do under the gospel, we ought to be thereof persuaded 
without scruple; and are justified by the faith we have, not by the work we do: Rom. 
xiv, 5, 'Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind.' The other reason which 
follows necessarily is obvious, Gal. ii, 16, and in many other places of St. Paul, as 
the ground work and foundation of the whole gospel, that we are 'justified by the 
faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law.' (852) 
According to Milton, religion under the gospel is grounded in faith, but you cannot change 
a person's faith - what this person has been persuaded to believe is true - by using outward 
force against them: "Surely force cannot work persuasion, which is faith II (852). However, 
Milton not only argues that the use of outward force is "ineffectual and weak" (848) at 
changing a person's belief; he also asserts that it increases sin when used in matters of 
religion. He writes that outward force "cannot therefore justify nor pacify the conscience: 
and that which justifies not in the gospel, condemns; is not only not good, but sinful to do, 
Rom. xiv, 23, 'Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin'" (852). The individual who uses force in 
matters of religion commits a sin, but this sin also increases sin of another kind. For those 
who are forced to worship God in a way that they do not believe is right also commit sin: 
"It concerns the magistrate then to take heed how he forces in religion conscientious men, 
least by compelling them to do that whereof they cannot be persuaded, that wherein they 
cannot find themselves justified, but by their own consciences condemned, instead of 
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aiming at their spiritual good, he force them to do evil" (852). To explain further this point, 
Milton also argues that trying to force profane and licentious men to serve God by making 
them perform religious and holy duties is IIhateful to God" because they cannot really 
perform such duties, "being themselves unholy" (853). Milton concludes that "force neither 
instructs in religion nor begets repentance or amendment of life, but, on the contrary, 
hardness of heart, formality, hypocrisy, and, as I said before, every way increase of sin" 
(853). Thus, here Milton again makes the same argument as Locke. Both assert that under 
the gospel humans must have faith in order to find salvation, but that the use of outward 
force cannot make a person acquire this faith and instead only increases sin. 
However, Milton suggests that even if a person could infallibly judge of God's will, 
and outward force was an effective way of changing a person's belief and producing faith, it 
would still be sinful to force people to worship God in a particular way because God does 
not want outward force used in matters of religion. In making this point, Milton refutes 
those who use Scripture to support the use of force in matters of religion. For example, he 
is aware that some people rely on Romans 13: 1, "let every soul be subject unto the higher 
powers," to prove that it is necessary for magistrates to use force in matters of religion. 
Milton rejects this interpretation for two reasons. First, he writes, "how prove they that the 
apostle means other powers than such as they to whom he writes were then under; who 
meddled not at all in ecclesiastical causes, unless as tyrants and persecutors? And from 
them, I hope, they will not derive either the right of magistrates to judge in spiritual things, 
or the duty of such our obedience" (844). Here Milton asks how anyone can prove that st. 
Paul was not referring only to the civil authorities of his time. Milton argues that the civil 
authorities of st. Paul's time did not use force in matters of religion unless they were 
tyrants. In other words, some of the civil authorities in St. Paul's time did use force in 
matters of religion. Nevertheless, by labelling those that did as "tyrants and persecutors," 
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Milton cleverly suggests that Romans 13 cannot be referring to these particular rulers. 
Milton then asks "how prove they next that [St. Paul] ... entitles them here to spiritual 
causes from whom he withheld, as much as in him lay, that judging of civil?" (844). In 
other words, how can they prove that st. Paul entitles the magistrate to judge in civil as 
well as spiritual matters? To support his argument that God does not want magistrates to 
judge in spiritual matters, Milton refers to I Corinthians 6: 1, "Dare any of you, having a 
matter against another, go to law before the unjust, and not before the saints?" Elsewhere 
in this treatise, Milton recognises that "some are so eager in their zeal of forcing," that they 
believe Christ's words recorded in Luke 14: 23, "compel them to come in," proves that 
force can be used in matters of religion, flas if the parable were to be strained through every 
word and phrase, and not expanded by the general scope thereof; which is no other here 
than the earnest expression of God's displeasure on those recusant Jews and his purpose to 
prefer the Gentiles on any terms before them: expressed here by the word compel" (849), 
Milton explains that God compels "by the inward persuasive motions of his spirit and by 
his ministers, not by outward compulsions of a magistrate or his officers" (849); he 
therefore challenges his opponents by interpreting both Romans 13 and Luke 14 as 
confirmation that God does not want outward force used in matters of religion. 
Similarly, Milton argues that Christ neither needs nor wants force to be used for 
this purpose. Milton explains that the "spiritual power by which Christ governs his church, 
.. [is] all-sufficient ... [and is] powerful [enough] to reach the conscience and the inward 
man with whom it chiefly deals, and whom no power else can deal with" (848). Given that 
Christ's spiritual power is all-sufficient, Milton asserts that 
to show us the divine excellence of his spiritual kingdom, [Christ is] able without 
worldly force to subdue all the powers and kingdoms of this world, which are 
upheld by outward force only: by which to uphold religion otherwise than to defend 
the religious from outward violence, is no service to Christ or his kingdom but 
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rather a disparagement, and degrades it from a divine and spiritual kingdom to a 
kingdom of this world: which he denies it to be because it needs not force to 
confirm it. (847) 
Here Milton argues that unlike the secular kingdoms of this world, Christ's spiritual 
kingdom does not require the use of force to uphold it and that trying to do so only 
degrades it. He argues that God, knowing the worst that men can do, "gave us this liberty 
as by him judged best," to be free from state imposition in matters of religion (854). 
Therefore, Milton declares that using outward force to promote religious things is "contrary 
to what [God] ... hath commanded" (852), and that "Christ rejects outward force in the 
government of his church" (847). For both Milton and Locke this is reason enough in itself 
for the state not to use force in matters of religion. 
Although Milton argues that the state should not use force in matters of religion, he 
indicates that the state should use force in civil matters. Milton frequently implies in this 
treatise that the magistrate can, in some cases, legitimately use force upon others. He 
writes that the I!civil magistrate" should not be called on "to interpose his fleshly force" in 
matters of religion, and that "there can be no place then left for the magistrate or his force 
in the settlement of religion" (848, 854, emphasis added). So, although the magistrate 
should not, according to Milton, use force in matters of religion, the above examples clearly 
show that the magistrate does have the use of force at his disposal. For what purpose, then, 
should the magistrate use his force? Milton partly answers this question where he writes: 
For the two tables, or ten commandments, teach our duty to God and our neighbour 
from the love of both; give magistrates no authority to force either .... As for civil 
crimes, and of tlle outward man, which all are not, no, not of those against the 
second table, as that of coveting; in them what power they have, they had from the 
beginning, long before Moses or the two tables were in being. (854) 
Here Milton argues that although the magistrate cannot force people to love God and their 
neighbours, he has always had the authority to prevent men from harming their neighbours 
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(which means he will defend most, but not all, of the commandments on the second table 
concerning one's obligations to his neighbour), Thus, like Locke, Milton asse:t1s that civil 
magistrates can legitimately use force to punish "civil crimes II (854) and to defend 1I0ur 
civil rights" (840). 
In accordance with his assertions that force should not be used in matters of 
religion, Milton suggests, in some places in Of Civil Power, that civil law should protect the 
individual's "birthright" (850) to worship God in the manner that he or she thinks is best. 
He writes, for example, "that the settlement of religion belongs only to each particular 
church by persuasive and spiritual means within itself, and that the defense only of the 
church belongs to the magistrate" (854). Milton suggests here that civil law should enable 
members of a particular church to determine for themselves how best to worship God, and 
it is up to the magistrate to defend this "rightful liberty" (854). This is also confirmed 
elsewhere in this treatise, where Milton writes that the magistrate should use force "to 
defend the religious from outward violence" (847), and that the magistrate should attend to 
"the defence of things religious settled by churches within themselves" (848). Thus, Milton 
argues that the state should not use force in matters of religion, but should use force to 
defend the "right" (854) of the individual to worship God in the manner that he or she 
thinks is best. 
By asserting that one of the functions of government is to ensure that people are not 
persecuted for their religious beliefs, Milton ends up wanting what Locke wants: freedom 
of religious worship. Locke does not claim that protecting this freedom is one of the 
functions of government; he does, however, argue that saving souls is not the function of 
government and that if government does its job and protects its citizens' individual property 
rights, then IIno man whatsoever ought ... to be deprived of his terrestrial enjoyments upon 
account of his religion" (416). Thus, although here the arguments of Milton and Locke 
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differ slightly, the result is the same: both want freedom of religious worship (although 
again I must point out that both make important exceptions that I will discuss in part three 
of this chapter). As I have already indicated, Milton describes this freedom of religious 
worship as a "birthright" and a "rightful liberty, " and elsewhere in this treatise he describes 
it as a "sacred gift of God" (852). Thus, he also uses the same words that Locke uses to 
describe freedom, and in doing so presents the liberal concept of freedom as a God-given 
quality that is natural to mankind. However, Milton argues that religious freedom is a 
"right" without reference to natural law, which for Locke is that by virtue of which all 
rights exist. Locke never describes this freedom of religious worship as a natural right, 
although it is difficult to understand why, given that he argues that it is a freedom that God 
endorses. Nevertheless, although their arguments differ slightly, Milton and Locke both 
assert that the individual should be free to worship God in a way that he or she thinks is 
best. 
Milton provides the same reasons for claiming that the magistrate should not use 
force in matters of religion as he does for claiming that the church authorities should not 
use force either. He writes that because of the many "injustices of force and fining in 
religion, besides what I most insist on, the violation of God's express commandment in the 
gospel, . . . church governors cannot use force in religion" (840). Milton, however, 
recognises that "some will object that this overthrows all church discipline," to which he 
replies: "true church discipline ... is exercised on them only who have willingly joined 
themselves in that covenant of union, and proceeds only to a separation from the rest, 
proceeds never to any corporal enforcement or forfeiture of money, which in all spiritual 
things are the two arms of Antichrist, not of the true church" (842). He supports this 
assertion with reference to the gospel: "we read not that Christ ever exercised force but 
once, and that was to drive profane ones out of his temple, not to force them in" (853). 
47 
Thus, he concludes that excommunication is a legitimate way for the church to exercise 
discipline upon its members. However, like Locke, Milton emphasises that the church must 
not excommunicate people "to destruction, but, as much in her lies, to a final saving. Her 
meaning, therefore, must needs be that ... her driving out brings on no outward penalty" 
(853). As an example, Milton reveals that from his point of view all Catholics probably 
worship God in the wrong way: he asserts that a heretic is someone "who maintains 
traditions or opinions not probable by scripture, who, for ought I know, is the papist only" 
(844). However, he writes that although "such as these, indeed, were capitally punished by 
the law of Moses, as the only true heretics, idolaters, plain and open deserters of God and 
his known law, ... in the gospel such are punished by excommunication only: Tit. iii, 10, 
'An heretic, after the first and second admonition, reject'" (844). So although Milton 
believes that Catholics probably worship God in the wrong way, he concludes here that 
under the gospel they should not be corporally punished for this by the church. Instead, it 
is only legitimate for a church to excommunicate Catholics. Thus, like Locke, Milton 
asserts that the church can only legitimately exercise discipline through excommunication; 
it cannot legitimately use force against, or take money from, those who worship God in a 
different way. 
Like Locke, Milton also asserts that the church should use persuasion rather than 
force to achieve its purpose. He frequently points out that "the state of religion under the 
gospel is far differing from what it was under the law" (848), and argues that "now is the 
state of grace, manhood, freedom, and faith, to all which belongs willingness and reason, 
not force" (848). Moreover, he again uses Scripture to support his argument: "the true 
people of Christ, as is foretold, Psalm ex, 3, 'are willing people in the day of his power'" 
(849). Thus, as I have previously mentioned, Milton argues that under the gospel people 
must have faith and be willing to serve and worship God in order to find salvation. For 
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Milton, however, this belief and willingness can only bc effectively advanced by 
persuasion, and not force: "force cannot work persuasion, which is faith" (852). Here 
Milton makes the argument, also made by Locke, that the use of persuasion is the only way 
to change a person's belief and establish faith. Thus, he writes that "the settlement of 
religion belongs only to each particular church by persuasive and spiritual means within 
itself' (854). Once a church has decided upon how best to serve and worship God, its 
members can legitimately persuade others to join their way of worshipping God "by fit and 
proper means ordained in church discipline, by instant and powerful demonstration to the 
contrary; by opposing truth to error, no unequal match" (849). Like Locke, then, Milton 
argues that the church can legitimately use persuasion but not force to try to establish true 
faith. 
In a number of important ways, then, Milton's argument in OJ Civil Power is the 
same as Locke's in A Letter Concerning Toleration. Milton starts with the premise that 
under the gospel nothing is "more different than church and state government" (844). He 
then argues, like Locke, that the state should not use its force in matters of religion because, 
under the gospel, no one can infallibly detennine God's will, force is ineffectual at 
changing belief and establishing faith, and Christ neither wants nor needs force to be used 
in this way. However, both Milton and Locke maintain that the state can legitimately use 
force in civil matters. Moreover, they both assert that although the church cannot 
legitimately use force, it can legitimately use persuasion to achieve its purpose of 
establishing faith. Given that Locke's late political thought is legitimately regarded as a 
definitive statement of liberal political thought, the fact that Milton's argument in OJ Civil 
Power is in a number of important ways the same as Locke's in the Letter means that 
Milton is a liberal in this treatise. 
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(iii) 
Although Milton preaches religious toleration and asserts the separation of church 
and state, he compromises this ideal in a number of ways. This has been observed by 
Barker, who writes that although lithe arguments of the last ecclesiastical pamphlets 
constituted a demand for unrestricted liberty [in religion] (especially in O/Civil Power) ... 
it is nevertheless ,true that . . . [Milton's] conclusions were . . . modified by restraining 
limitations" (235). However, the presence of these restraining limitations does not 
necessarily mean that Milton departs from Lockean liberalism. In "The Limits of Locke's 
Toleration," William Walker demonstrates that Locke's theory of toleration, as it expressed 
in A Letter Concerning Toleration, is also compromised in a number of ways. Thus, to 
determine whether the various limitations that Milton places on his theory of religious 
toleration distance him from or align him with liberal political thought, I will first need to 
examine the ways in which Locke places limits on his theory of religious toleration. 
One of the problems that Walker identifies is that the separation of church and state, 
which Locke asserts as one of the premises in his argument for religious toleration, is 
compromised by Locke's assertion that no such boundary exists under theocratic 
government. As I have already shown, Locke maintains that "the commonwealth of the 
Jews ... was an absolute theocracy," and that as such "the laws established there 
concerning the worship of one invisible deity were the civil laws of the people, and a part 
of their political government" (418). Walker explains that here Locke "implicitly defmes 
the commonwealth as any society founded for the sake of various interests where those 
interests may include religious interests" (140), and that this conflicts with his opening 
definition of a commonwealth as "a society of men constituted only for the procuring, 
preserving, and advancing of their own civil interests" (393). Walker points out that "the 
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opening definition of the church and commonwealth combined with Locke's treatment of 
ancient Israel as a commonwealth really amounts to this: the church and commonwealth are 
absolutely separate, except when they are absolutely the same" (141). So "when some kind 
of theocracy is in place (absolute theocracy presumably being only one kind of theocracy), 
the boundary between church and commonwealth disappears. And once this happens, it 
becomes legitimate for the magistrate (who is also an ecc1esiast) to use outward force to 
persecute those who are engaging in what he deems to be idolatrous practises of worship" 
(141). Walker rightly concludes that by Locke's own principles in the Letter, 
the Pope is justified in persecuting, or ordering the civil powers of catholic 
commonwealths to persecute, those who violate ecclesiastical law. . .. Given that 
the Catholic church is a kind of theocracy, a commonwealth in which there is no 
difference between church and commonwealth, the magistrate of this 
commonwealth, like that of ancient Israel, would be justified, by the premises of 
Locke's own argument in favour of toleration, in persecuting those members of that 
commonwealth who violated ecclesiastical law. (142) 
Thus, in this respect, Locke compromises the distinction between church and state, which is 
vital to his argument for religious toleration. 
Walker also points out that Locke's argument for religious toleration is further 
compromised by his claim that the magistrate can forbid any religious rite or ceremony 
under certain conditions. For example, Locke writes that the magistrate is not obligated to 
tolerate those that "have a mind to sacrifice infants, or ... lustfully pollute themselves in 
promiscuous uncleanness, or practice any other such heinous enormities" (414). The 
reason these things should not be tolerated, writes Locke, is that they "are not lawful in the 
ordinary course of life, nor any private house; and therefore neither are they so in the 
worship of God, or in any religious meeting" (415). Walker rightly concludes here that 
"the magistrate is not obligated to tolerate and may forbid under the threat of his outward 
force any religious rite or ceremony which is not lawful in the ordinary course of life" 
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(138). However, Locke goes on to argue that even things that are lawful in the ordinary 
course of life can still be banned by the magistrate under certain conditions. He writes that 
if a person can lawfully kill his own calf at his own home, then he should be able to legally 
kill his calf at a religious meeting. However, 
if peradventure such were the state of things, that the interest of the Commonwealth 
required all slaughter of beasts should be forborne for some while, in order to the 
increasing of the stock of cattle, that had been destroyed by some extraordinary 
murrain, who sees not that the magistrate, in such a case, may forbid all his subjects 
to kill any calves for any use whatsoever? Only 'tis to be observed that in this case 
the law is not made about the religious but the political matter; nor is the sacrifice 
but the slaughter of calves thereby prohibited. (415) 
The magistrate can therefore forbid any religious practice if that conflicts with the "interest 
of the Commonwealth." Walker discusses how this passage significantly limits Locke's 
theory of toleration: 
Given that any practice may, under certain circumstances, conflict with civil 
interest, no practice which a church regards as part of its worship is, on principle, 
beyond the jurisdiction of the magistrate; any rite and ceremony may, given certain 
circumstances, be forbidden by the magistrate; all churches may, in some situations, 
be destroyed by the magistrate. And these circumstances need not be so 
'extraordinary' - in Locke's example, the magistrate's destruction of the church 
whose worship includes the killing of calves is grounded in nothing more than a 
shortage of beef. (139) 
Ultimately, then, no religious practice is exempt from the magistrate's control. 
Locke takes advantage of this qualification in his theory of religious toleration and 
argues that atheists and Catholics should be not be tolerated by the state. He writes that 
"those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God," because "the promises, 
confidence, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an 
atheist" (426). So, according to Locke, because atheists cannot be trusted they need not be 
tolerated by the magistrate. Moreover, Locke strongly suggests that Catholics should not 
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be tolerated because they serve a foreign ruler and are therefore a threat to the interests of 
the English commonwealth. In An Essay Concerning Toleration (1667), Locke writes that 
it is "impossible ... to make papists (whilst papists) friends to your government, being 
enemies to it both in their principles and interest" (202). For this reason, Locke concludes 
that "Roman Catholics ... oUght not to be tolerated by the magistrate in the exercise of 
their religion" (197). Although Catholics are not explicitly mentioned in the Letter, it is 
reasonable to assume that his argument here is also directed against Catholicism: 
that Church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is constituted 
upon such a bottom that all those who entered into it do thereby, ipso facto, deliver 
themselves up to the protection and service of another prince. For by this means the 
magistrate would give way to the settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own 
country, and suffer his own people to be listed, as it were, for soldiers against his 
own government. (426) 
He suggests here that Catholicism should not be tolerated by the English magistrate 
because its members are obliged to protect and serve the Pope, rather than the English 
government. 
Locke also suggests that Catholics should not be tolerated because they do not 
tolerate others. He writes, in the Letter, that "no opinions contrary to human society, or to 
those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated 
by the magistrate" (424), and that those 
who attributed unto the faithful, religious, and orthodox, that is, in plain terms, unto 
themselves, any particular privilege or power above other mortals, in civil 
concernments; or who, upon pretence of religion, do challenge any manner of 
authority over such as are not associated with them in the ecclesiastical communion: 
I say these have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate; as neither those that will 
not own and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere religion. (425) 
Locke argues here that those who do not believe in toleration, teach toleration, or practice 
toleration, should not be tolerated themselves. Thus, as Walker points out, "all members of 
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all churches must, first, claim that they believe in the duty of religious toleration and, 
secondly, teach that all men have a duty to tolerate others' religious beliefs. The magistrate 
may persecute with outward force those who do not" (145). It is for this reason that Locke 
argues explicitly in the Essay that the magistrate should not tolerate Catholics: "papists are 
not to enjoy the benefit of toleration because where they have power they think themselves 
bound to deny it to others" (202). Once again, although Locke never directly mentions 
Catholics in the Letter, it is reasonable to conclude that his argument here was intended to 
justify state persecution of Catholics. This interpretation is supported by Ashcraft, who 
writes that "Locke repeats in the Letter all the standard allegations against Catholics that 
were so common in the exclusion-crisis pamphlet literature. . .. These charges, taken 
together, are sufficient grounds for denying toleration to Catholics" (Revolutionary 502-
503). 
Thus, in the name of protecting the interests of the commonwealth, Locke 
transcends the "fixed and immovable" (403) boundaries that divide church and state and 
argues that those who do not tolerate and those whose religion binds them to a foreign 
ruler, by which he means Catholics, as well as those who do not believe in God, should not 
be tolerated by the magistrate. Ashcraft is therefore correct when he observes that lias a 
contribution to the political debate on toleration," the Letter "represents an attempt both to 
occupy the higher ground of principles and at the same time to rake up the most basic anti-
popery prejudices and fears that shaped the popular response to James' policies" 
(Revolutionary 498). So although Locke preaches religious toleration and asserts that 
church and state should be separate, he compromises this position by arguing that atheists, 
Catholics, and many others should not be tolerated by the state. 
This contradiction constitutes a major problem for Lockean liberalism: it can never 
separate itself from its religious foundations. As I have shown, Locke's political thought 
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derives from his understanding of God. Locke's political assertions are therefore the 
product of his religious beliefs. It is because of his religious beliefs that Locke asserts, for 
example, that the magistrate can legitimately forbid any religious practice if it conflicts 
with "the interest of the Commonwealth." These interests of the commonwealth are 
founded on Locke's religious belief that God has provided man with natural property rights 
that government should protect. Thus, when Locke asserts that it is in the state's best 
interest not to tolerate atheists or Catholics, essentially it is because they hold beliefs about 
church and state that are different from his own. In this respect, Locke's Protestant political 
beliefs are similar to the political beliefs of Catholics: both derive their political beliefs 
from their religious beliefs, both assume their political beliefs to be infallible, and both 
determine that the magistrate should persecute those who have certain religious beliefs or 
practises. The religious beliefs of Catholics led them to argue that Protestants should be 
persecuted by the state, and Locke's religious beliefs led him to argue that Catholics should 
be persecuted by the state. As this example shows, because Lockean liberalism is a 
political philosophy founded on religious beliefs, the opponents of Lockean liberalism will 
always be both political and religious opponents. So although Lockean liberals assert the 
need for religious toleration and the separation of church and state, they can never achieve 
either because these assertions are founded on religious beliefs. Lockean liberals also 
assert that all those who hold views that conflict with the politics of Lockean liberalism will 
not be tolerated. We can conclude, therefore, that Lockean liberalism only offers a very 
limited form of religious toleration: only those who conform with the politics of Lockean 
liberalism will be tolerated; all those who disagree with the politics of Lockean liberalism, 
or who hold religious beliefs or practices that conflict with the politics of Lockean 
liberalism, will not be tolerated. 
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Having established that liberalism harbours a limited theory of religious toleration, I 
am now able to determine more comprehensively how Milton stands in relation to this 
political philosophy. We can begin by observing that like Locke, Milton compromises his 
theory of religious toleration by asserting that under theocracy religious persecution is 
justified. He suggests that if rulers receive "immediate divine direction" and "had a 
commonwealth by ... [God] delivered them, incorporated with a national church," then 
"the church might be called the commonwealth, and the whole commonwealth the church" 
(845). When such a theocracy exists, Milton argues that "the law had no distinct 
government or governors of church and commonwealth, but the priests and Levites judged 
in all causes, not ecclesiastical only, but civil" (849). Moreover, Milton writes that under a 
theocracy, the use of "force was not unbefitting" and the laws (civil and ecclesiastical) were 
"to be performed according to the letter, willingly or unwillingly" (848). Milton therefore 
argues that under the law of Moses, religious persecution was justified because it was a 
theocracy and rulers could receive immediate divine direction. Under the gospel, Milton 
argues that because rulers can no longer receive immediate divine direction and church and 
state are separate, religious persecution is no longer justified. This, however, is just 
Milton's interpretation of what God wants under the gospel, and Milton himself admits that 
"the knowledge and service of God ... [is] liable to be variously understood by human 
reason," and "no man or body of men in these times can be the infallible judges or 
determiners in matters of religion" (840-41). Milton suggests, that is, that if rulers do 
receive immediate divine direction then they are justified in using force in matters of 
religion. However, according to Milton's admittedly fallible judgement, rulers do not 
receive immediate divine direction under the gospeL Catholics disagree with Milton 
because they believe that the Pope does receive immediate divine direction under the 
gospeL According to Milton's own principles in this treatise, it is perfectly reasonable for 
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Catholics not to agree with Milton, since no one can infallibly determine in matters of 
religion and God's will is liable to be variously understood by human reason. Moreover, 
"given that the Catholic church is a kind of theocracy, a commonwealth in which there is no 
difference between church and commonwealth, the magistrate of this commonwealth, like 
that of ancient Israel, would be justified" by the premises of Milton's own argument in 
favour of toleration, "in persecuting those members of that commonwealth who violated 
ecclesiastical law" (Walker 142). Walker's comments here actually refer to the premises of 
Locke's argument, but can be applied with equal accuracy to the premises of Milton's 
argument. By compromising his theory of religious toleration in this respect, Milton's 
political thought is similar to Locke's. 
Like Locke, Milton also suggests that religious practices that conflict with civil 
interests should not be tolerated. For example, he writes: 
Let them cease then to importune and interrupt the magistrate from attending to his 
own charge in civil and moral things, the settling of things just, things honest, the 
defence of things religious settled by the churches within themselves; and the 
repressing of their contraries determinable by the common light of nature. (848) 
Here Milton suggests that it is the magistrate's job to defend a particular church's ability to 
worship God in the manner that its members have decided is best. However, he qualifies 
this by suggesting that the magistrate should nevertheless repress anything that he deems to 
be in conflict with his attending to civil and moral things, and this he can determine with 
reference to "the common light of nature." If, therefore, the magistrate uses "the common 
light of nature" to determine that a religious practice conflicts with the interests of the state, 
he should, according to Milton, repress it. Thus, the magistrate can, under certain 
circumstances, repress any religious practice. Given that no religious practice is, on 
principle, beyond the jurisdiction ofthe magistrate, Milton's theory of religious toleration is 
again compromised. 
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Milton further limits his theory of religious toleration by suggesting that the 
magistrate should not tolerate those who interpret Scripture in a way that is probably 
wrong. He argues that by repressing things that conflict with the interests of the state, the 
magistrate will not "constrain or repress religion probable by scripture, but the violators and 
persecutors thereof' (848). Put another way, Milton argues that by repressing things that 
conflict with the interests of the state, the magistrate will only be constraining or repressing 
"the violators or persecutors" of religion not "probable by, scripture." The interests of the 
state are clearly conflated here with religious issues. The function of the state is presented 
as detennining what is probably God's will and repressing what is probably not God's will. 
Thus, if a religious belief or practice is, according to the magistrate's judgement, contrary to 
"the common light of nature" or not "probable by scripture," then, Milton argues, the 
magistrate can legitimately use force against it. Milton's theory of religious toleration is 
therefore similar to Locke's, in the sense that both provide the magistrate with the 
opportunity to repress legitimately any religious belief or practice. 
Milton takes advantage of this qualification in his theory of religious toleration and 
argues that Catholics should not be tolerated by the state. He writes, 
their religion the more considered, the less can be acknowledged a religion, but a 
Roman principality rather, endeavouring to keep up her old universal dominion 
under a new name, and mere shadow of catholic religion; being indeed more rightly 
named a Catholic heresy against the scripture, supported mainly by a civil and, 
except in Rome, by a foreign power: justly therefore to be suspected, not tolerated, 
by the magistrate of another country. (846) 
Here Milton argues that Catholicism is much more a Roman political power than it is a 
religion. The English magistrate, therefore, is right to regard Catholics as subjects of a 
foreign prince, and a political threat, and therefore not to tolerate them. This argument 
closely resembles Locke's implied argument in the Letter. Like Locke, then, Milton 
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condones state persecution of Catholics on the grounds that they are essentially citizens of a 
foreign country and a threat to the English. 
Elsewhere in Of Civil Power, Milton argues that those who consider themselves to 
be infallible judges of God's will and use force in matters of religion should also be 
persecuted by the state, and he identifies Catholics as a group worthy of state persecution 
for this reason. He writes that those "who [use] force [in matters of religion], though 
professing to be protestants, [do not] deserve ... to be tolerated themselves" (846). Thus, 
like Locke, Milton asserts that those who use force in matters of religion should not be 
tolerated. Furthennore, Milton associates this crime with Catholicism or, in his words, 
"popery" (846). For example, he declares that "the papist, judging by his principles, 
punishes them who believe not as the church believes," and that those who use force in 
matters of religion are "guilty of popery in the most popish point" (846). Milton therefore 
indicates, like Locke, that because Catholics use force in matters of religion they "may not 
hence plead to be tolerated" (846). 
Milton also suggests that the state should persecute Catholics because they are 
idolaters. In Of Civil Power, he clearly connects Catholicism with heresy and idolatry. He 
defines a heretic as a person "who maintains traditions or opinions not probable by 
scripture," and adds, "who, for ought I know, is the papist only" (844). Milton argues that 
as "the only true heretics, idolaters, plain and open deserters of God and his known law," 
Catholics "were capitally punished by the law of Moses ... but in the gospel such are 
punished by excommunication only" (844). Here Milton clearly identifies Catholics as 
heretics and idolaters, but argues that under the gospel they should not be persecuted by the 
state. This argument, however, is later discarded by Milton: 
For idolatry, who knows it not to be evidently against all scripture, both of the Old 
and New Testament, and therefore a true heresy, or rather an impiety, wherein a 
right conscience can have nought to do; and the works thereof so manifest that a 
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magistrate can hardly err in prohibiting and quite removing at least the public and 
scandalous use thereof. (846) 
Here Milton argues that idolatry is a heresy and should not be tolerated by the state. Milton 
has already stated that for all he knows, only Catholics commit heresy. So according to 
Milton idolatry is a heresy and only Catholics commit heresy. Thus, he strongly suggests 
that Catholics are idolatrous. It therefore becomes clear that his call for the state 
persecution of idolaters, is largely a call for the state persecution of Catholics. This 
determination is also supported by Woolrych, who writes, "popery Milton brackets with 
idolatry, and he would have the magistrate tolerate neither" (50). Similarly, Barker writes 
that "idolatry ... seemed to Milton obviously intolerable," and that "to the Puritan mind it 
was practically indistinguishable from popery; Milton therefore denied freedom ... to 
Roman Catholics" (251). 
Ultimately, then, Milton's theory of religious toleration only applies to Protestants 
who tolerate other Protestants. He argues that Protestants who use force in matters of 
religion against other Protestants do not deserve to be tolerated themselves. Moreover, he 
argues that Catholics should not be tolerated because they are the subjects of a foreign 
prince and are therefore politically dangerous; they claim infallibility and use force in 
matters of religion; and they are idolaters. Accordingly, Milton's theory of religious 
toleration alters over the course of his argument in Of Civil Power. One of his opening 
assertions, for example, is that "no man ought to be punished or molested by any outward 
force on earth" for his "belief or practice in religion" (840, emphasis added). Later, 
however, he asserts that "no Protestant . .. ought ... to be forced or molested for religion" 
(846, emphasis added). Like Locke, Milton preaches religious toleration on the one hand, 
but on the other excludes all non-Protestants (including atheists) and attempts to justify the 
state persecution of Catholics. 
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This contradiction exists because Milton's Protestant political thought is plagued 
with the same problems as Lockean liberalism. Milton's political assertions, like Locke'S, 
are founded on his religious beliefs. One of Milton's political assertions, for example, is 
that Catholics should not be tolerated by the civil magistrate because their religious beliefs 
conflict with the interests of the state, one of which is to ensure that every individual is able 
to worship God in the manner that he or she thinks is best. One reason that Milton makes 
this assertion is that he believes, fIrst, that there is "no other divine rule or authority from 
without us . . . but the holy scripture, and no other within us but the illumination of the 
Holy Spirit" (840-41). He also believes that "no man can know at all times" whether he is 
illuminated with the Holy Spirit "much less to be at any time for certain in any other" (841) 
and, therefore, that "no man or body of men in these times can be the infallible judges or 
determiners in matters of religion" (841). These religious beliefs in part account for 
Milton's assertion that the state should ensure that every individual is able to worship God 
in the manner that he or she thinks is best. The religious beliefs of Catholics, however, lead 
them to very different political conclusions. According to Milton, "the pope . .. assumes 
to himself . . . infallibility over both the conscience and the scripture" (841); Catholics 
believe that following the Pope's instructions, communicated to the individual' through the 
strict hierarchy of the Catholic church,is more important than following their own 
interpretation of Scripture; and "the papist" uses force in matters of religion and "punishes 
them who believe not as the church believes" (846). Thus, Milton's religious beliefs lead 
him to conclude that the state should not use force in matters of religion and should ensure 
that the individual is able to worship God in the manner that he or she thinks is best, 
whereas the religious beliefs of Catholics lead them to conclude that the state should use 
force in matters of religion and should ensure that the individual worships God in the 
maimer that the Catholic church thinks is best. So Milton supports persecution of Catholics 
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because of the particular ways in which their religious beliefs differ from his own. 
Realising that this compromises his theory of religious toleration, Milton adds that if 
Catholics "ought not to be tolerated, it is for just reason of state more than of religion" 
(846). Despite Milton's efforts to conceal the connection between his religious beliefs and 
his political assertion that Catholics should be persecuted by the state, such a connection 
does exist and cannot be severed. For Milton'S political thought, like Locke's, cannot be 
separated from the Protestant religious beliefs on which it is founded. As Barker points 
out, for Milton "the strict segregation of the spiritual and natural was not only undesirable 
but impossible," for he "never abandoned his belief in the need for discipline according to 
absolute divine truth ll (279, 332). This inability to separate church and state proves to be a 
problem for Milton's theory of religious toleration in Of Civil Power, just as it is for Locke 
in the Letter. 
In Of Civil Power, then, Milton's political thought is the same as Locke's in a 
number of ways. Like Locke, he promotes religious toleration for the reasons that no one 
can infallibly detennine God's will, force is ineffectual at changing belief and establishing 
faith, and God does not want force used in matters of religion. Milton also argues, like 
Locke, that the state has the authority to use force in civil matters. Both also argue that 
although the church should never use force, it can legitimately use persuasion to change 
belief, establish faith, and increase membership. 
Like Locke, Milton also compromises the asserted boundaries between church and 
state and places limits on his theory of religious toleration: he argues that under theocracy 
religious persecution is justified, religious practices that conflict with the interests of the 
state should not be tolerated, and those who interpret Scripture in a way that is probably 
wrong should not be tolerated. The result is that the state can, under certain circumstances, 
repress any religious belief or practice. Milton exploits this qualification in his theory of 
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religious toleration and argues that Catholics should not be tolerated by the state because 
they are the subjects of a foreign prince and are therefore threat to the state, they believe 
that they have infallible knowledge of God's will, and they use force against those who 
have different religious beliefs and practices. Moreover, he suggests that the state should 
persecute Catholics because they are idolaters. Thus, Milton's theory of religious toleration 
ultimately applies to Protestants only. This limited theory of religious toleration confirms 
Milton as Lockean liberal in this treatise. For as Walker has pointed out, Locke's theory of 
religious toleration is also limited. The politics of both Locke and Milton are a product of 
their Protestant religious beliefs, and they both end up asserting that all those who do not 
conform with their political assertions, or who hold religious beliefs that conflict with their 
political assertions, should not be tolerated by the state. In Of Civil Power, then, Milton in 
many ways makes the same arguments as Locke, which means there are strong grounds for 
thinking of Milton as a liberal in this tract. There are, however, no grounds for thinking of 
Milton as a republican in this tract. 
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3. MACHIAVELLI, LOCKE, AND THE STATE: 
MILTON'S THE READY AND EASY WAY 
(i) 
In this chapter I will begin to analyse the late Miltonrs relationship to republican and 
liberal political thought by examining his political thought in the second edition of The 
Ready and Easy Way. This pamphlet was published in April 1660, during a time of 
increased political unrest. After the death of Oliver Cromwell in 1658, his son Richard was 
made Protector but did not remain in this position for long. The army opposed the 
Protectorate Parliament's intention to tighten state control of the church, and in April, 1659, 
General Charles Fleetwood, supported by some five hundred army officers, forced Richard 
to resign and dissolve his parliament (Fallon 180). Under rising pressure from the more 
radical junior army officers, Fleetwood was persuaded to restore the old Rump Parliament, 
which had previously been dismissed by Cromwell in 1653. However, with memories of 
1653 still fresh, the members of this newly established parliament instituted measures to 
restrict the powers of Fleetwood, the commander-in-chief, and to weed out those army 
officers who were felt to be closely associated with the Cromwellian regime. On 13 
October, 1659, the army, under the command of General John Lambert, dissolved the 
Rump Parliament and set up a Committee of Safety. But this, too, proved to be an unstable 
power structure. As Robert T. Fallon points out, many people did not accept the army's 
Committee and instead displayed "frequent open expressions of sentiment for the return of 
the king,!! and rrthere was strong agitation in the streets of London for the restoration of the 
Rump" (194, 185). In response to this popular unrest, on 21 February 1660, General 
George Monk forced the Committee of Safety to readmit a number of the Parliament 
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members who had been excluded by Pride's Purge in 1648 because of their willingness to 
continue negotiating with Charles I (Worden, Stuart England 123). 
It was after these events that Milton published the first edition of The Ready and 
Easy Way, with which he hoped "to remove if that be possible, this unsound humour of 
returning to old bondage [monarchy]" (Complete Prose Works 354-355). Moreover, to 
secure this end, Milton also wrote a letter to Monk in which he tells him that in order to 
secure "our Liberties ... the chief Gentlemen out of every County" should be educated on 
"the Danger and Confusion of readmitting Kingship in this land" ("Present Means" 393). 
He recommends to Monk that a "General Council" be established, "whose Office must be, 
with due Caution, to dispose of Forces, both by sea and land, under the conduct of your 
Excellency, for the preservation of Peace, both at home and abroad" (394). If, however, the 
General Council meets and its members "refuse these fair and noble Offers of immediate 
Liberty, and happy Condition," then there are certainly sensible Englishmen "in every 
County who will thankfully accept them" (395).3 Fallon rightly explains that here Milton is 
advising Monk to dissolve the General Council if its members demonstrate any monarchist 
leanings. This he will easily achieve, Milton advises, since he has "a faithful Veteran 
Anny, so ready, and glad to assist you in the prosecution thereof' (395).4 Despite Milton's 
advice, however, General Monk appears to have been set on making popular opinion the 
final arbitrator on the type of government chosen for England. On 16 March, in response to 
further pressure by Monk, the new Rump Parliament dissolved itself and issued writs for a 
new election (Fallon 195). Milton's second edition of The Ready and Easy Way was 
published sometime shortly after this event, since he observes that "writs for new elections 
have been recalled" (Complete Poems And Major Prose 880). Once again, he declares that 
3 RT. Fallon. 201. 
4 201. 
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he hopes "to remove, if that be possible, this noxious humour of returning to bondage" 
(880). Thus, this second edition of The Ready and Easy Way represents Milton's desperate 
last attempt at convincing his fellow Englishmen that monarchy is not the best form of 
government for England at this time. The question before us, however, is to what extent 
does Milton, in attempting to fulfil this task, align himself with liberal and republican 
political thought. 
(ii) 
In order to clarify Milton's position in this tract in relation to republicanism, it is 
first necessary to establish exactly what constitutes "republicanism." Thus, a 
comprehensive study of republicanism will be presented with reference to the work of 
Skinner and Pocock, who are both highly regarded political theorists and considered to be 
leading authorities on republican political thought. Skinner and Pocock both focus on the 
writings of Niccoli) Machiavelli, an influential sixteenth-century Italian republican theorist. 
According to Skinner, the goal that republican writers "emphasise above all is that of 
attaining greatness - greatness of standing, greatness of power, greatness of wealth" 
("Machiavelli's Discorsi" 125). However, republicans assert that to achieve civic greatness, 
citizens must live a free way oflife. In The Discourses, Machiavelli begins, writes Skinner, 
by connecting the capacity to achieve civic greatness with the enjoyment of 'a free 
way of life.' The key statement of the case again appears at the start of Book II. 'It 
is easy to understand how an affection for living a free way of life springs up in 
peoples. For one sees by experience that cities have never increased either in power 
or in wealth unless they have been established in liberty,' ("Machiavelli's Discorsi" 
140) 
To acquire civic greatness, then, it is first necessary for citizens to enjoy a free way of life. 
But what exactly does Machiavelli mean by 'a free way of life?' Skinner explains, in "The 
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Idea of Negative Liberty," that according to Machiavelli "there have always been two 
roughly distinguishable groups of citizens," with "contrasting dispositions (umori)," and 
"different reasons for prizing their freedom to pursue their chosen ends" (205): the grandi, 
rich and powerful, on the one hand, and the plebe or popolo, ordinary citizen, on the other. 
The grandi desire "to obtain power and glory for themselves and avoid ignominy at all 
costs. . .. Their principal aim is obviously to remain as free as possible from any 
destruction (sanza ostaculo) in order to act in such a way as to acquire glory for themselves 
by way of dominating others" (205). The main concern of ordinary citizens, however, "will 
usually be no more than to live a life of security," and "their basic aim is obviously to 
remain free so far as possible from all forms of interference in order to lead their own 
undisturbed lives" (205). According to Machiavelli, then, whether citizens desire power 
and glory or mere security, "a free way of life" equates to the "absence of constraint, 
especially absence of any limitations imposed by other social agents on one's capacity to 
act independently in pursuit of one's chosen goals" (206). To republicans like Machiavelli, 
the freedom to pursue one's chosen goals without constraint is what it means to have a free 
way of life. 
Machiavelli argues, however, that only by living in a free state will citizens be able 
to enjoy this individual freedom. He maintains, according to Skinner in "The Idea of 
Negative Liberty," that the only form of polity "in which the citizens can hope to retain any 
freedom to follow their own pursuits will be one in which it makes sense to say that the 
community itself is 'living a free way of life'" (206). Skinner explains that by this 
Machiavelli means a community "that is 'not subject to the control of anyone else,' and is 
thus able, in virtue of being unconstrained, 'to govern itself according to its own will' and 
act in pursuit of its own chosen ends" (207). Machiavelli therefore claims that if a 
community is not free, then neither will its citizens be free. Skinner identifies the two 
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threats that Machiavelli says must be eontrolled in order to maintain a free state and 
eonsequently individual freedom. First, there is the threat from within a community, which 
"reflects the desire of the grandi to achieve power at the expense of oppressing their fellow-
citizens. This is an ineliminable threat, for the grandi we have always with us, and they are 
invariably disposed to pursue these selfish goals" (208). Unless a political community can 
devise various ways and means of beating down the ambition of the grandi, "'they will 
quickly bring it to ruin' and 'reduce it to servitudettl (209). Free communities are also 
threatened by external threats. Some political communities "are content 'to live quietly and 
enjoy their liberty within their own boundaries,' but others are ambitious to dominate their 
neighbours and coerce them into acting as client states" (209). The Romans, for example, 
"waged continuous war on all the people surrounding them, attaining their own 'supreme 
greatness,' their own power and glory, by conquering each neighbour in tum, overthrowing 
their liberta and subjecting them to the service of Rome" (209). Skinner writes that "as 
with individual grandi, so with entire communities, this disposition to act ambitiously is 
altogether natural and ineliminable" (209). Moreover, "just as the clients of ambitious 
grandi find themselves coerced into serving their patron's ends, so too the citizens of any 
polity that becomes the client of another will automatically forfeit their personal liberty, 
since they will find themselves forced to do their conqueror's bidding as soon as the 
community is reduced to servitude" (209). Thus, republicans argue that to enjoy personal 
freedom it is necessary to live in a free state, a state where servitude arising from internal 
and external threats is kept at bay and where "the will of the body politic determines its 
own actions" and "the actions ofthe community as a whole" (207). 
Aecording to Skinner, Machiavelli also insists that, in general, this free state ideal 
cannot be achieved under monarchy but is possible only under republican forms of 
government. In "Machiavelli's Discorsi and the Pre-Humanist Origins of Republican 
68 
Ideas," Skinner says that for a republican like Machiavelli, ttthe common good is scarcely 
ever promoted under princely or monarchical rule. . .. Kings are always liable to be 
suspicious of ... men of eminent talent who are most capable of serving their country well" 
(139). On the other hand, "Machiavelli's positive thesis states that the only way to ensure 
the promotion of the common good must therefore be to maintain a republican form of 
government" (140). Given the importance of promoting the common good in a free state 
where the community as a whole determines its own actions, Skinner concludes that for 
Machiavelli, "it is only possible to live 'in a free state' under a self-governing replJblic" 
("Machiavelli's Discorsi" 140), a govermnent consisting of rulers or magistrates who "must 
always be elected," "must always remain subject to the laws and institutions of the city 
which elect them," and "must always act to promote the common good - and hence the 
peace and happiness of the sovereign body of its citizens tt ("The State" 108). 
Furthermore, Skinner writes that in general Machiavelli "makes a sharp distinction between 
the freedom of republics and the slavery imposed not merely by tyrants but even by the best 
kings and princes" (Machiavelli's Discorsi 141). Thus, Skinner argues that republicans 
repudiate monarchy and assert that a free state can only be achieved under republican forms 
of government. 5 
Machiavelli argues that once a free state is established with a republican 
constitution, it can only be maintained by willing citizens who have the particular qualities 
5 Although I refer here to Skinner's argument that republicans repudiate monarchy and are committed to 
republican funns of government, I am aware that this particular definition of what constitutes repUblican 
political thought is contested by some critics. Blair Worden, for instance, argues that "English republicanism 
of the 1650s is, , . more often a criticism of the English republic than an endorsement of it. Classical and 
Renaissance republicanism favoured mixed government." ("Milton And Marchamont Nedham" 169), 
Similarly, in The Machiavellian Moment, Pocock argues that mixed government is one of the forms of 
government recommended by Machiavelli in The Discourses. This made it possible for the English, during 
the interregnum, to adopt republican political thought: "mixed government ... [was] the term which rendered 
it possible for the king's subjects to accept the republican tradition." (370). Moreover, according to Pocock, 
Machiavelli argues that if the populace of a political community becomes corrupt, "the only real hope lies in 
the absolute power of one man of transcendent virtue, who will end corruption by restoring virtue in the 
people" (206, emphasis added). 
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required to serve their state. ill liThe Idea of Negative Liberty," Skinner relates how in The 
Discourses Machiavelli argues that in order to control the unavoidable and constant threats 
to personal freedom, citizens need actively to serve their state so that it remains free. 
Machiavelli warns his readers that "unless we are willing personally to contribute to the 
defence of our community against external aggression, we shall 'lay it open as a prey to 
anyone who chooses to attack it,' as a consequence of which, sooner than later, we shall 
find ourselves enslaved" (210). Thus, Skinner writes, "it follows that a readiness to 
volunteer for active service, to join the anned services, to perform one's military services, 
constitutes a necessary condition of maintaining one's own individual freedom from 
servitude" (213). However, in order to be successful in defending the community against 
the threat of conquest, Machiavelli asserts that citizens will need courage, determination, 
and prudence. Skinner explains, tlprudence tells you when to go to war, how to conduct the 
campaign, how to bear its changing fortunes" (210). Courage, coupled with sheer 
determination and persistence, is a "quality indispensable for effective defence .... 
Courage is also the quality that must above all be instilled in every individual soldier if 
victory is to be grasped" (210). 
As well as dealing with the threat of external servitude, citizens must also defend 
their personal liberty by "preventing the grandi from coercing the popolo into serving their 
ends" (213). Machiavelli argues, writes Skinner, that the only way to prevent this from 
happening "is to organize the polity in such a way that each and every citizen is equally 
able to playa part in detennining the actions of the body politic as a whole. This in tum 
means a readiness to serve in public office, to pursue a life of public service, to perform 
voluntary services, [and] constitutes a further necessary condition of maintaining one's own 
liberty" (213-214). However, in order to be successful at preventing internal servitude, "all 
citizens who aspire to take a hand in government, to help in upholding the freedom of the 
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community, must be men of prudence" (211). As well as being a virtue necessary for the 
prevention of external servitude, prudence is also necessary "to allow the political decisions 
of a body-politic to be determined by the will of ... the entire membership of the body 
itself!! ("Republican Ideal" 303). Moreover, in liThe Idea of Negative Uberty," Skinner 
writes that according to Machiavelli "the other quality every citizen must cultivate is a 
willingness to avoid all forms of intemperate and disorderly behaviour, thus insuring that 
civic affairs are debated and decided in an ordered, well-tempered style" (212). Skinner 
points out that "in singling out these attributes, Machiavelli is of course invoking three of 
the four 'cardinal' virtues listed by the Roman historians and moralists" (214). Machiavelli, 
however, diverges from these historians and these moralists when it comes to the fourth and 
most important virtue justice. For Machiavelli "repudiates the crucial contention that the 
observance of this virtue is invariably conducive to serving the common good" (215). 
Machiavelli thus argues that the virtues of prudence, courage, and temperance are necessary 
if citizens wish to maintain a free state, but he does not agree with the classical republican 
theorists that the practice of justice is also required. 
Nevertheless, all republicans assert that a citizen's personal freedom is dependent 
upon his ability to cultivate the virtues necessary to serve his state and maintain its 
freedom. Courage, determination, and prudence are needed to defend the community 
against foreign invasion, and prudence, temperance and other civic qualities are needed to 
prevent the ambitious grandi from manipulating government for their own ends. In each 
case, it is in the citizen's best interest to cultivate the virtues necessary to serve his state, 
because ifhe does not, his state will not remain free and, as a consequence, he will lose his 
personal liberty and any chance at civic greatness. Thus, Skinner says that the reason 
Machiavelli 
offers us for cultivating the virtues and serving the common good ... is always that 
these represent, as it happens, the best and indeed the only means for us 'to do well! 
71 
on our own behalf, and in particular the only means of securing any degree of 
personal liberty to pursue our chosen ends ... , Although Machiavelli never speaks 
of interests, it is fair to say that he believes our duty and our interests to be one and 
the same. (219) 
For Machiavelli, then, in order to ensure and enjoy their personal freedom, citizens must 
cultivate the virtues and work to establish and maintain a free republic. Skinner points out 
that "Machiavelli is simply reiterating the same classical oxymoron: the price we have to 
pay for enjoying any degree of personal freedom with any degree of continuing assurance is 
voluntary public servitude" (210). Thus, for the republican, personal freedom is not a 
natural right, but rather a reward or privilege that is achieved as a result of the people's 
virtue and their ability to serve their state and protect it from bondage. 
In "The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty," however, Skinner explains that 
despite Machiavelli's assertion that it is in the best interest of the citizen to cultivate the 
virtues, he and other "republican writers place all their faith in the coercive powers of the 
law" to encourage citizens "to act virtuously" (305). Skinner says that in Book 1 of The 
Discourses, Machiavelli "first considers what induced the Roman people to legislate so 
prudently for the common good when they might have fallen into factional conflicts" (305-
306). He proposes that the answer lies in the way their laws were established. Such laws 
were established under the republican constitution of Rome when a proposed law was 
passed with the consent of two assemblies, "one assembly controlled by the nobility, 
another by the common people" (306). The result, writes Skinner, "was that only such 
proposals as favoured no faction could ever hope to succeed. The laws relating to the 
constitution thus served to ensure that the common good was promoted at all times" (306). 
Hence, this mechanism forced the Romans to be prudent and create laws that benefited all. 
In this way they avoid the danger of internal servitude created by the ambitious grandi 
dominating government and the people for their own benefit. 
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Machiavelli also valued the influences of religion to help enforce legislation and 
thus create civic virtue. In The Machiavellian Moment, Pocock discusses the role of 
religion, as it was perceived by Machiavelli in The Discourses. He points out that 
Machiavelli ranks the authors and founders of religion above those who have founded 
republics or kingdoms. The Prophet, writes Pocock, "is thought of as doing something 
explicable in human terms, he is the founder of the structure which possesses some 
property that makes it even more durable than a structure of inherited allegiance. For this 
reason [Machiavelli ranks the Prophet] ... above the legislator" (192). However, Pocock 
adds that to Machiavelli, religion "is not virtue itself," and the aim of "the legislator, at least 
if he is to found a republic," is to create "a structure of virtue" (192). Thus, Pocock 
explains that, according to Machiavelli, "the Prophet should aim at being a legislator and 
providing a religion which will serve as a sub-structure for citizenship. It follows that 
religious usages are only a part of whatever constitutes civic virtue" (192). In an important 
sense, then, Machiavelli subordinates religion to politics. He perceives religion to be an 
effective instrument with which to create and enforce legislation so that civic virtue can be 
achieved. This, rather than redemption, was of greatest importance to Machiavelli. Pocock 
writes that Machiavelli "distrusted Christianity - or at least he divorced it from the political 
good because it taught men to give themselves to ends other than the city's and to love 
their own souls more than the fatherland" (202). Machiavelli therefore preferred pagan 
religion to Christianity "as a social instrument," because it "served the purpose identical 
with that ofthe republic" (202). To develop a "dedication of oneself to a common good ... 
was the moral content of pagan religion and is the essence of civic virtue" (202). To 
Machiavelli, religion was therefore a means to an end. It was a political tool that could be 
used to instil civic virtue, a necessary condition for the maintenance of a free self-
governing republic and individual freedom. 
73 
Pocock also observes that Machiavelli's political thought is secular in the sense that 
it expresses a cyclical vision of history which contrasts with the linear Christian vision of 
history. He explains that for Machiavelli, although a republic can delay the onset of 
corruption in the long-tenn, by undertaking a prudent and defensive position, or in the 
short-tenn, by undertaking the more glorious aggressive and expansionary stance, 
ultimately the life of the republic is always finite: 
The republic attempted to realise that totality of virtue in the relations of its citizens 
with one another, but did so on a footing that was temporarily and spatially limited. 
Because it had a beginning in time, it must both offer an account of how that 
beginning had been possible and acknowledge that, since it must in theory have an 
end, its maintenance was no less problematic in its foundation. Because it had a site 
or location in space, it was surrounded by neighbours with whom its relations were 
not governed by the virtue existing only as between citizens. Temporarily if not 
spatially, it faced problems arising from the fact that it was in its own wayan 
innovator; spatially if not temporarily, it was involved in the world of unlegitimated 
power-relationships. (185) 
Because the republic constitutes a temporary place in time and space, it will ultimately be 
devoured by corruption. Thus, corruption was considered by Machiavelli to be "an 
irreversible, one-way process, part of the mutability and entropy of sublunary things; 
personality and polity may be kept in equilibrium or may decay, and there is no third 
possibility" (211). Pocock concludes that 
Machiavelli propounds the view that the amount of virtue in the world at anyone 
time is finite, and that when it is all used up through corruption there will be some 
kind of cataclysm, after which a few uncorrupted barbarian survivors will emerge 
from the mountains and begin again. The theory is cyclical and presupposes a 
closed, because not transcendent, system in the human and moral world. . . . 
Machiavelli arrives at it both through his abandonment of the dimension of grace 
and through his decision to regard virtue as existing only in republics that is, in 
finite quantities themselves finite in number, space, and time; we should remind 
ourselves that the only alternative to a cyclical aeternitas mundi was a Christian 
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eschatology .... A republican scheme of history therefore continued to befortuna-
dominated and cyclical, a matter of finite quantities of energy, rarely mobilized, 
inclined to be self-destructive and moving towards total entropy until some 
unpredictable force should mobilize them again. (217-218) 
In contrast with the linear Christian vision of history, therefore, the republicans viewed 
history as cyclical. 
By taking the arguments of Machiavelli as their model, Skinner and Pocock thus 
provide us with a comprehensive definition of what means to be a republican. Essentially, 
a republican asserts that to achieve civic greatness citizens must live a free way of life. A 
free way of life only occurs in a free state, and the form that such a state must take is a 
republic. 6 Skinner explains Machiavelli's definition of a republic as a government 
consisting of rulers or magistrates who "must always be elected," "must always remain 
subject to the laws and institutions of the city which elect them," and "must always act to 
promote the common good" ("The State" 1 08). A republican also asserts that a state will 
only remain free if its citizens cultivate certain virtues, such as courage and prudence, 
necessary to protect it from internal and external servitude. Thus, it is in the citizen's best 
interest to cultivate these virtues because they enable him to protect the freedom of his 
state, which in tum guarantees his personal freedom. However, the republican also relies 
upon the law, which ideally should be supported by influences of a religion, to ensure that 
citizens cultivate the virtues necessary to protect their state and hence their own personal 
freedom. Finally, in contrast to the linear Christian vision, republicans express a cyclical 
vision of history. 
6 I refer here to Skinner's definition only. Pocock does not argue that republicans asserted that it was 
necessary to have a republican form of government (see note 5 on page 69). 
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(iii) 
Working on this definition of republicanism, we can see that in The Ready and Easy 
Way~ Milton's assertion that a republic will bring civic greatness to the people conforms 
with republican political thought. For example, he contrasts the dismal consequences that 
he believes would follow from the failure to establish a republic in England with the civic 
greatness achieved by the Netherlands who have established one: he claims that if a 
republic is not established in England, then the English should be ashamed of themselves, 
given that "our neighbours the United Provinces, to us inferior in all outward advantages; 
who notwithstanding, the limits of greater difficulties, courageously, wisely, constantly 
went through the same work and are settled in all the happy enjoyments of a potent and 
flourishing republic to this day" (Complete Poems and Major Prose 884). Milton suggests 
here that a republic creates civic greatness in strength, wealth, and happiness. Later in the 
pamphlet, he makes a similar suggestion, claiming that lIof all governments, a 
commonwealth aims most to make the people flourishing, virtuous, noble, and high-
spirited" (897). Milton's use of the word "potent" suggests greatness in power; "virtuous, 
noble, and high-spirited" suggests greatness in moral standing and disposition; and 
"flourishing" suggests greatness in wealth. These statements are consistent with the 
republican argument that a republican government will create civic greatness. 
Like the classical republicans, Milton also equates freedom with republican 
government. In a statement that is distinctively republican, he writes that "the ground and 
basis of every just and free government ... is a general council of ablest men, chosen by 
the people" (888). Here Milton equates a free state with a republican form of government. 
Throughout The Ready and Easy Way, he refers to this government as a "free 
commonwealth" and argues that it is "the justest government, most agreeable to all due 
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liberty" (884). Civil liberty will be enjoyed under a republic because its leaders have the 
ability to make wise decisions for the good of the whole community. For Milton, the 
purpose of those who are elected to govern is "to consult of public affairs from time to time 
for the common good" (888). Thus, he writes that under a republic, "no man or number of 
men can attain to such wealth or vast possession as will need the hedge of an agrarian law 
(never successful ... ) to confine them from endangering our public liberty" (892). Here 
Milton's argument appears to reflect the republican belief that civil liberty is dependent 
upon the avoidance of internal servitude, a consequence of the ambitious grandi acquiring 
so much wealth and power that they can corrupt government. Milton, like Machiavelli and 
the classical republicans, argues that because those elected to govern a republic make 
decisions for the common good rather than for just one man or a small number of men, 
personal civil liberty will not be endangered. He concludes that civil liberties are "never 
more certain, and the access to these never more open than in a free commonwealth" (898). 
Thus, like Machiavelli and the classical republicans, Milton equates liberty with republican 
government. 
In The Ready and Easy Way, Milton also corroborates the republican tenet that 
citizens will need to cultivate certain virtues in order to construct and maintain a republican 
government. Milton says that "to make the people fittest to choose, and the chosen fittest to 
govern, will be to mend our corrupt and faulty education, to teach the people faith, not 
without virtue, temperance, modesty, sobriety, parsimony, justice" (891). Thus, Milton 
asserts that certain qualities will need to be cultivated so that the people choose the best 
people to govern them and so that those chosen will govern the people the best. It must 
also be noted that here Milton refers to two of the four virtues acknowledged by the 
classical republicans: "temperance" and "justice." Elsewhere in this pamphlet, Milton says 
the people from the United Provinces "courageously" (884) constructed a republic. 
77 
Moreover, Milton accepts Aristotle's argument that although men were first governed by 
kings, when "the number of prudent men increased" (893, emphasis added) a free 
commonwealth was fonned and tyrants were disposed of. Hence, as well as "temperance" 
and "justice," Milton also refers to the other two classical republican virtues, "courage" and 
"prudence," in connection with the fonnation of republican government. Thus, Martin 
Dzelzainis is correct when he writes that in The Ready and Easy Way, Milton insists that "if 
the commonwealth is to flourish and keep its autonomy ... then both rulers and ruled must 
cultivate the virtues," and that Milton emphasises "the four cardinal virtues to the study of 
which Cicero had devoted Book I of De Officiis" ("Republicanism" 21). Thus, like 
Machiavelli and classical republicans, Milton suggests that certain virtues are needed to 
construct and maintain republican government. 
The republican belief in the importance of citizens serving their state is also 
reflected in The Ready and Easy Way. For example, in promoting the goodness of 
republican government, Milton says, "what government comes nearer to this precept of 
Christ than a free commonwealth, wherein they who are greatest, are perpetual servants and 
drudges to the public at their own cost and charges, [and] neglect their own affairs" (885). 
Although Machiavelli would not have used Christianity to make a favourable comparison 
with republican government as Milton does here, it is nevertheless significant that Milton 
stresses the importance of citizens serving their state, rather than just expecting their state 
to serve them. This concept is an essential part of republican political thought. Later in 
this pamphlet, Milton says that under a free commonwealth civil liberties will be enjoyed 
by "every person according to his merit" (896). Here Milton appears to be advocating the 
republican theory of freedom, because he suggests that freedom is not a given, but an 
enjoyment that must be earned according to "merit." Given that Milton has already 
demonstrated that he places importance on citizens serving their state, it is reasonable to 
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argue that by "merit" Milton is referring to how well a citizen serves the commonwealth, 
and for Milton serving the commonwealth at this particular time equates to rejecting 
Charles as monarch. For example, Milton argues that those who want Charles restored 
"have both in reason and trial of just battle lost the right of the election what the 
government shall be" (895). According to Milton, those who want Charles restored do not 
serve their commonwealth and have therefore lost their freedom to vote for the form of 
government they want. So, although the republicans would not have limited civil liberty in 
the way that Milton wants to here, his assertion that civil liberties will be enjoyed by "every 
person according to his merit" conforms with an essential tenet of republican political 
thought - that individual freedom is dependent upon how well the individual serves his 
state. 
Milton also conforms with republican political thought in this pamphlet, in the sense 
that he contrasts his support of republican government with criticism of monarchy. He 
suggests, for example, that while choosing a free commonwealth is "most cherishing to 
virtue and true religion," it is sinful for people to choose monarchy as their form of 
government. He refers to the Old Testament where, after the people of Israel decide they 
want a king to rule them, God tells Samuel, "for they have not rejected thee, but they have 
rejected me, that I should not reign over them. According to all the works which they have 
done since the day that I brought them up out of Egypt even unto this day, wherewith they 
have forsaken me, and served other gods, so do they also unto thee" (1 Samuel 8: 7-8). 
Milton interprets this for his readers, asserting that IIGod in much displeasure gave a king to 
the Israelites, and imputed it a sin to them that they sought one" (885). Milton also refers to 
the New Testament where Jesus says to his disciples, "Ye know that they which are 
accounted to rule over the Gentiles and exercise lordship over them; and their great ones 
exercise authority upon them. But so shall it not be among you: but whosoever will be 
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great among you, shall be your minister: And whosoever of you will be the chiefest, shall 
be servant of all" (Mark 10: 42-44). Milton concludes from this that "Christ apparently 
forbids his disciples to admit of any such heathenish government [monarchy]" (885). 
These biblical references are used by Milton to suggest to his readers that choosing 
monarchy as a form of government is against the will of God and therefore sinful. A 
similar presentation of monarchy is repeated later, where Milton argues that if monarchy 
returns, those "new royalized presbyterians" who supported Charles will not receive the 
reward they expect. Milton predicts what will happen if monarchy returns: 
Let them but hear the insolencies, the menaces, the insultings of our newly animated 
common enemies crept lately out of their holes, their hell I might say by the 
language of their infernal pamphlets, the spew of every drunkard, every ribald; 
nameless, yet not for want of licence, but for very shame of their own vile persons, 
not daring to name themselves, while they traduce others by name; and give us to 
foresee that they intend to second their wicked words, if ever they have power, with 
more wicked deeds. Let our zealous backsliders forethink now with themselves 
how their necks yoked with these tigers of Bacchus, - these new fanatics not of the 
preaching, but the sweating-tub, inspired with nothing holier than the venereal pox -
can draw one way under monarchy to the establishing of church discipline with 
these new-disgorged atheisms. (894) 
As Laura Lunger Knoppers points out, "Milton draws on the castigating language of the 
prophets - sexual impurity, disease, animal yoking, prostitution, vomit - to create powerful 
satire and invective" (219). Here Milton clearly associates the return of monarchy with a 
multitude of sins. 
Milton also criticises monarchy by presenting it as wasteful, degrading and 
exploitative. He argues that the people will pay a "lavish price" (885) if monarchy is 
restored in England. Rather than doing anything to benefit the public, a monarch "will have 
little else to do but to bestow the eating and drinking of excessive dainties, to set a pompous 
face upon the superficial actings of state, to pageant himself up and down in progress 
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among the perpetual bowings and cringings of an abject people, on either side deifying and 
adoring him for nothing done that can deserve it" (885). Here Milton presents monarchy 
as excessive, wasteful and superficial. He argues that the people are required to treat the 
king as if he is a god when he does nothing useful for them. Moreover, Milton presents 
monarchy as an influence that degrades the English people: "a king must be adored like a 
demigod, with a dissolute and haughty court about him, of vast expense and luxury, masks 
and revels, to the debauching of our prime gentry, both male and female; not in the 
pastimes only, but in earnest, by the loose employments of court service, which will then be 
thought honourable" (885). Having made his general point on the superficiality of court 
service, Milton then gives examples to strengthen his point. He writes that if a monarch 
returns, the nobility and gentry will be "bred up then to the hopes not of public, but of court 
officers, to be stewards, chamberlains, ushers, grooms even of the close-stool; and the 
lower their minds debased with court opinions, contrary to all virtue and reformation, the 
haughtier will be their pride and profuseness" (885). Here Milton argues that monarchy 
will degrade the English people in body and mind. He also argues that the only reason 
monarchs aim to make the people wealthy is so that they can then be exploited: "Monarchs 
will never permit [the people to become flourishing, virtuous, noble, and high-spirited. 
Monarchs] aim ... to make the people wealthy indeed perhaps, and well fleeced for their 
own shearing and the supply of regal prodigality, but otherwise of softest, basest, 
vicious est, servilest, easiest to be kept under" (897). Here Milton is clearly critical of the 
monarchical form of government on the grounds that it is exploitative and oppressive. 
Milton also argues that monarchy is oppressive because it promotes the servitude of 
the people. For example, fearing that the English people will elect to restore monarchy, 
Milton declares in the opening paragraph that by writing this pamphlet he hopes "to 
remove, if it be possible, this noxious humour of returning to bondage - instilled of late by 
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some deceivers, and nourished from bad principles and false apprehensions among too 
many of the people" (880). He knows, however, that he may not succeed: "if the absolute 
determination be to enthrall us, before so long a Lent of servitude they may permit us a 
little shroving time first, wherein to speak freely and take our leaves of liberty" (880). This 
assertion, that if monarchy returns the people will no longer be free, also marks Milton's 
interpretation of recent historical events. He applauds the Rump Parliament, which just 
nine days after the execution of Charles I, on 7 February 1649, declared the office and 
power of a king unnecessary, burdensome, and dangerous to liberty, safety, and public 
interest (881): 
The Parliament of England, assisted by a great number of the people who appeared 
and stuck to them faithful est in defence of religion and their civil liberties, judging 
kingship by long experience a government unnecessary, burdensome, and 
dangerous, justly and magnanimously abolished it, turning regal bondage into a free 
commonwealth, to the admiration and terror of our emulous neighbours. (881) 
Here Milton presents monarchy as oppressive and expresses his approval of the Rump 
Parliament's decision to abolish it. Later in this pamphlet Milton argues that having 
achieved freedom from "regal bondage," the people would really be returning to a servitude 
from which they would never recover were they to reinstate monarchy: 
Ifwe returned to kingship and soon repent (as undoubtedly we shall when we begin 
to find the old encroachments coming on by little and little upon our consciences, 
which must necessarily proceed from king and bishop united inseparably in one 
interest), we may be forced perhaps to fight over again all that we have fought, and 
spend over again all that we have spent. (884) 
Milton suggests here that if monarchy returns, the church and state will be combined at the 
expense of the peoples' religious freedom, and the English may again have to fight for their 
freedom. According to Milton, a return to kingship would mean a return to servitude, and 
therefore this choice would make "vain and viler than dirt the blood of so many thousand 
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faithful and valiant Englishmen who left us in this liberty, bought with their lives" (884). 
Milton therefore argues that monarchy is a form of bondage that was justly abolished and 
that its return would amount to disrespect for those who fought for freedom. 
Having made this general argument, Milton then describes in more detail how a 
king would gain absolute power over the people ifhe returned to England. He says that "if 
there be a king, which the inconsiderate multitude are now so mad upon," the grand council 
"shall be called, by the king's good will and utmost endeavor, as seldom as may be. For it 
is only the king's right, he will say, to call a parliament; and this he will do most commonly 
about his own affairs rather than the kingdom's, as will appear plainly so soon as they are 
called" (892). Milton predicts that 
the parliament shall be soon dissolved, or sit and do nothing; not suffered to remedy 
the least grievance, or enact aught advantageous to the people. Next, the council of 
state shall not be chosen by the parliament, but by the king, still his own creatures, 
courtiers and favorites, who will be sure in all their counsels to set their master's 
grandeur and absolute power, in what they are able, far above the people's liberty. 
(892-893) 
If a monarch is introduced into the government of England, Milton argues that he will soon 
be able to manoeuvre himself into a position of absolute power at the expense of those 
elected into parliament and "far above the people's liberty." He says that ifthe king returns, 
he will quickly gain control over the army, so that all veterans who fought with Cromwell 
against the tyranny of Charles I "shall be soon disbanded (and likeliest without arrear or 
pay)" and will "be questioned for being in arms against their king" (895). Next, Milton 
details exactly how the king's return would jeopardise the people's liberty. First, he argues 
that the people's civil liberties will be compromised. He says that if a king returns, he will 
place "extraordinary levies on our estates," and there will be "indictments, inquiries, 
discoveries, complaints, informations, who knows against whom or how many" (894). 
These charges may result in "utmost infliction," "imprisonment, fines, banishment, or 
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molestation" (894). In general, however, Milton says that if a monarch returns, "disfavor, 
discountenance, disregard, and contempt on all but the known royalists, or whom he 
favours, will be plenteous" (894). Milton also discusses in more detail the effects the king's 
return will have on the people's freedom to worship God in a manner that they think is best. 
He says that "it hath been observed of old" that kings "have ever suspected most and 
mistrusted them who were in most esteem for virtue and generosity of mind, so it is now 
known [that kings] ... have most in doubt and suspicion them who are most reputed to be 
religious" (896). Milton adds that kings "hear the gospel speaking much ofliberty - a word 
which monarchy and her bishops both fear and hate" (896). A monarch, writes Milton, is 
"the natural adversary and oppressor of liberty" (893). If monarchy is going to be restored 
in England, Milton laments that "our condition is not sound, but rotten, both in religion and 
all civil prudence ... all national judgements under foreign or domestic slavery" (898). 
Thus, in parts of The Ready and Easy Way, Milton conforms with the republican assertion 
that monarchy is a form of government which is incompatible with the freedom of the 
citizens. 
Having made this observation, we can now see that the critics who present Milton 
as a republican because he repudiates monarchy in The Ready and Easy Way, are, to a 
limited extent, correct. Milton does conform with republican political thought in The 
Ready and Easy Way in the sense that he clearly contrasts the virtues of republican 
government with the vices of monarchy. As Woolrych observes, this pamphlet celebrates 
"republican liberty and virtue in contrast with monarchical tyranny and servitude." And 
Norbrook is in a sense correct when he writes that, in The Ready and Easy Way, "Milton 
both practises and preaches a commitment to the power and value of republican language," 
and that "Milton sees kingship as a form of blasphemy." There are, however, problems 
with the claims made by Woolrych, Norbrook, and other critics who base Milton's 
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republicanism in part on his repudiation of monarchy. The assertions that these critics 
make need qualification. 
First, it is important to recognise that the reasons Milton expresses for opposing 
monarchy are often different from those cited by Machiavelli. Milton uses Scripture, for 
example, to support his assertion that monarchy is a sinful form of government, and he 
equates a return to monarchy with the loss of religious freedom. Machiavelli and the 
classical republicans, on the other hand, were not concerned with the moral standing, in 
Christian terms, of monarchy or any particular form of government, nor did they express 
particular concern for freedom of religious worship. Milton's Christian beliefs, therefore, 
account for one of the main reasons why he expresses different reasons for opposing 
monarchy from those cited by Machiavelli. Milton also accuses monarchy of being 
excessive, wasteful, and superficial. Machiavelli and the classical republicans, however, do 
not direct criticism of this sort against monarchy as a form of government. Rather, as 
Skinner has clearly pointed out, the republican theorists of Renaissance Italy argued that a 
fthereditary prince ... will generally seek his own ends rather than the common good, [and] 
the community will ... fOlfeit its liberty" ("The State" 104). Machiavelli, then, criticises 
monarchy for its general inability to promote the common good, whereas Milton, in 
addition to expressing similar criticism of monarchy, also presents monarchy as sinful, 
excessive, wasteful, superficial, and a threat to spiritual liberty. We must therefore 
recognise that much of the criticism of monarchy that Milton expresses in The Ready and 
Easy Way is different from that of the republican theorists. 
Secondly, although throughout most of this pamphlet Milton asserts unqualified 
criticism of monarchy, though not always for the same reasons as the republicans, his 
condemnation of this form of government is by no means absolute. For example, one ofhis 
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comments strongly suggests that he is certainly not opposed to the monarchy of Christ. He 
writes that 
there can be no cause alleged why peace, justice, plentiful trade, and all prosperity 
should not thereupon ensue throughout the whole land ... even to the coming of our 
true and rightful and only to be expected King, only worthy as he is our only 
Saviour, the Messiah, the Christ, the only heir of his eternal father, the only by him 
anointed and ordained since the work of our redemption finished, universal Lord of 
all mankind. (891-892) 
Here Milton argues that only Christ is their rightful king since He is the only one worthy of 
this position. In contrast to the bulk of his argument in this pamphlet, here Milton clearly 
expresses an acceptance of monarchy where Christ is king. The argument that Milton 
asserts here may conform with Lejosne's and Himy's interpretation of Milton's politics in 
Paradise Lost. As I have observed in my introduction, both Lejosne and Himy make the 
general argument that in Paradise Lost, Milton "made monarchy in Heaven justifY 
republicanism on earthtt (Lejosne 106). The passage above from The Ready and Easy Way 
could also be interpreted in this way, but Milton is probably referring to Christ's second 
coming, which means that he is arguing that Christ will actually physically come and rule 
as king on earth, rather than from Heaven. Thus, this passage demonstrates that in The 
Ready and Easy Way, Milton's criticism of monarchy is not without exception and is not as 
straightforward as some critics presume. 
Elsewhere, however, Milton also suggests that he is not opposed to monarchies in 
principle, even ones where Christ is not king. For he accepts ttthat monarchy of itself may 
be convenient to some nations," and "that there may be such a king who may regard the 
common good before his own, may have no vicious favourite, may hearken only to the 
wisest and incorruptest of his parliament" (893). We can conclude here that Milton is not 
referring to Christ's monarchy, since there is only one Christ and he uses the plural 
"nations," and because it is unlikely that Milton would believe that Christ would need a 
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parliament, let alone consult one. So here Milton asserts that monarchy, even without 
Christ, is not necessarily a bad form of government. 
Having identified these ways in which Milton qualifies his repudiation of monarchy, 
we can interpret his position on monarchy in this pamphlet in two different ways. First, it 
could be argued that in The Ready and Easy Way Milton opposes all monarchies where 
Christ is not king, and that this is why the bulk of his argument constitutes a critique of 
monarchy and why he says that only Christ is worthy of being king. This interpretation, 
however, fails to account for Milton's short admission that monarchy is not necessarily a 
bad form of government. Thus, the more logical interpretation is that Milton is not against 
monarchy in principle, but is opposed to England returning to monarchy at this time. This 
interpretation is supported by textual evidence in The Ready and Easy Way. For example, 
after having admitted that monarchy is not necessarily bad, Milton writes: 
To us who have thrown ... [monarchy] out, [to receive it] back again ... cannot but 
prove pernicious. For kings to come, never forgetting their former ejection, will be 
sure to fortify and arm themselves sufficiently for the future against all attempts 
hereafter from the people; who should be then so narrowly watched and kept so low 
that. .. they never shall be able to regain what they now have purchased and may 
enjoy, or to free themselves from any yoke imposed upon them. (893) 
ill other words, Milton argues that although monarchy is not necessarily a bad form of 
government, it is a bad choice of government for England at this time. The English have 
already thrown out a king who became a tyrant (Charles I); to receive another one back 
again would be dangerous because a new king would be sure to subdue the people so that 
his position is kept secure. Hence, Milton believes that if Charles is made king, he will be a 
tyrant. So although Milton is not against monarchy in principle, in his desperation to stop 
the tyranny of Charles, he criticises monarchy without qualification throughout much this 
pamphlet as though he is against monarchy in principle - as a rhetorical strategy in order 
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to help him persuade his readers not to make Charles king of England. Thus, Milton's 
argument is really designed to repudiate tyranny, not monarchy. 
Critics such as Brown, Lejosne, Woolrych, Norbrook, and Skinner, who claim that 
Milton repudiates monarchy, thus fail to recognise Milton's position in regard to monarchy. 
The sense in which Milton is a republican in The Ready and Easy Way, at least under our 
definition of republicanism, is qualified because the argument in this pamphlet is designed 
to repudiate tyranny, not monarchy. Further qualification is also required after recognising 
that where Milton does criticise monarchy, he often gives reasons for his criticism that 
differ !,1featly from those of the republicans. Thus, even if his repudiation of monarchy is 
absolute, which it clearly is not, the sense in which Milton is a republican in The Ready and 
Easy Way would still need to be qualified by recognising these differences. In many other 
respects, however, Milton's political thought conforms with republicanism: he asserts that 
republican government will bring greatness to the people; that republican government will 
promote liberty; and that citizens will need to serve their state and cultivate certain virtues 
in order to construct and maintain a republican government. But that Milton conforms in 
some important ways with republican political thought still leaves open the question of how 
he is related to liberal political thought. 
(iv) 
In The Ready and Easy Way, Milton argues, like Locke, that all men are born free, 
for God "didst create mankind free!" (898). Elsewhere in this pamphlet, he argues that 
implementing a free commonwealth will be easy, and will not require "the introducement 
of new obsolete forms or terms, or exotic models - ideas that would effect nothing but with 
a number of new injunctions to manacle the native liberty of mankind" (892, emphasis 
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added). So here Milton's presentation of man is similar to Locke's, in the sense that both 
assert that man was created free and is naturally free. 7 Throughout The Ready and Easy 
Way, Milton also asserts that government should protect this natural freedom. For example, 
he applauds a free commonwealth - whose members he refers to as the "keepers of our 
liberty" - because of its ability to "preserve us a free people" (887-888). Moreover, he 
suggests that protecting individual freedom is "one main end of government" (895). Thus, 
like Locke, Milton asserts that God created humans free, humans are naturally free, and that 
government should protect this freedom. Milton also suggests that government should 
base its laws on the laws of nature: lithe law of nature ... is the only law of laws truly and 
properly to all mankind fundamental, the beginning and the end of all government" (882). 
Thus, given that he asserts that humans have a God-given natural freedom which 
government should protect, it is reasonable to conclude that for Milton, as for Locke, one of 
the laws of nature is that humans remain free. Thus, in the above passages Milton 
expresses ideas about nature, man, freedom, and the state that are consistent with libenil 
political thought: he asserts that God created man free and that man is naturally free; he 
implies that natural law dictates that man be free; and he maintains that government should 
protect man's freedom. 
Milton's defence of religious toleration in The Ready and Easy Way is also similar 
to Locke's in the Letter. For Milton, freedom of worship is the "liberty to serve God and to 
save his own soul according to the best light which God hath planted in him to that 
purpose" (895). Milton gives a number of reasons why government should protect this 
freedom and refrain from using force in matters of religion. One reason is "that Christ in 
his church hath left no vicegerent of his power; but himself, without deputy, as the only 
head thereof, governing it from heaven. . .. Christ ... hath not left the least shadow of a 
7 However, although Locke asserts that "we are born free" ("Two Treatises" 61), unlike Milton, he qualifies 
this statement by arguing that children are not free until they can learn to reason and understand the laws 
89 
command for any such vicegerence from him in the state, as the pope pretends for his in the 
church" (887). Milton implies that no civil authority has legitimate power over the church 
because Cluist has never delegated this power to anyone. This, we may recall, is one of the 
reasons for religious toleration given by Locke in the Letter. Another reason given by both 
Locke and Milton is that everyone must interpret God's will for themselves. Milton writes 
that it is only "by the reading of his revealed will [in the Scriptures] and the guidance of his 
Holy Spirit" (895) that people are able to serve God and find salvation. Therefore, he 
argues that there is "no supreme judge or rule in matters of religion but the scriptures - and 
these to be interpreted by the scriptures themselves, which necessarily infers liberty of 
conscience" (895). According to Milton, Scripture is the word of God but everyone must 
interpret the Scriptures, and therefore God's will, for themselves. As Milton points out, the 
result is that everyone has the freedom to worship God in the way that they have interpreted 
is best. Like Locke, then, Milton argues that everyone has the freedom to determine God's 
will for themselves. 
Milton also emphasises the importance of freedom of worship. He writes that 
having this freedom His best pleasing to GodH (895), and he therefore considers this 
religious freedom to be "the best part of our liberty" (883) and asserts that it "ought to be to 
all men dearest and most precious" (895). Thus, as I have already observed, one of the 
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prevalent reasons Milton gives for opposing monarchy in this pamphlet is that it represents 
a loss of religious freedom. He argues that kings are known to be suspicious of those who 
are reputed to be religious, and that kings "hear the gospel speaking much of liberty - a 
word which monarchy and her bishops both fear and hate" (896). One of the main reasons 
Milton gives for establishing a free commonwealth, on the other hand, is that it will protect 
religious freedom. He writes that "no government [is] more inclinable ... to protect [this 
which apply to them ("Two Treatises" 55-61). 
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liberty of conscience], than a free commonwealth" (895). Because it is capable of 
providing this liberty, Milton argues that a free commonwealth is "most cherishing to virtue 
and to religion, but also (I may say it with greatest probability) plainly commended, or 
rather enjoyed by our Saviour himself to all Christians" (884). Although Milton differs 
from Locke in the sense that Locke does not condemn or require a particular form of 
government, the emphasis that Milton places upon the importance of religious freedom is 
consistent with Lockean liberalism and contrasts with republicanism. For under republican 
political theory, freedom of religious worship is not a priority. On the contrary, religion is 
used as a political tool to make people obey the law and thus become virtuous citizens. For 
Milton and Locke, however, there is nothing more important than religious freedom, 
because it is a condition which is necessary for serving God and finding eternal salvation. 
Milton's priorities, therefore, are those of Lockean liberalism, and they contrast sharply 
with those asserted in republican political theory. 
Like Locke, Milton also argues that if the officials of a government do not protect 
the people's liberties, then they may be justly resisted with force. Milton best demonstrates 
his endorsement of this liberal concept in his defence of those who rebelled against, and 
ultimately executed, Charles 1. He writes that "the Parliament of England, assisted by a 
great number of the people who appeared and stuck to them faithfu1est in defence of 
religion and their civil liberties, judging kingship by long experience a government 
unnecessary, burdensome, and dangerous, justly and magnanimously abolished it" (881). 
Here Milton seems to be suggesting that rebellion is justified if the people judge it to be the 
best course of action. However, after giving this initial justification for rebellion, Milton 
then defends those who rebelled against Charles on the grounds that Charles violated his 
agreement with God and the people. Milton argues that Charles was entrusted by God and 
the people to preserve "the true religion and our liberties" (881). In return, the people of 
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England covenanted "to preserve the king's person and authority" (881). According to 
Milton, however, Charles breached this contract by "endeavouring to bring in upon our 
consciences a popish religion," (881) and by causing the massacre of Englishmen in Ulster 
by plotting with Irish rebels. Milton argues that by violating the liberties of his subjects, 
Charles had acted against God's will. Thus, Milton determines that the English people 
"could not serve two contrary masters, God and the king" (881). Milton suggests here that 
government represents a trilateral agreement between those who govern, those who are 
governed, and God. If government violates the liberties of the people, then it also violates 
God's will and it is just for the people to rebel. Locke on the other hand, asserts that 
government only represents an agreement between those who govern and those who are 
governed, and if this agreement is broken by a government which violates the people's 
rights, then it is dissolved and those who were formally under its governance have the right 
to rebel. However, we may recall that assertions such as these are qualified, because Locke 
also asserts that the terms of the agreement between ruler and ruled should be based on, and 
must not conflict with, natural law, which is the manifestation of God's will. So if 
government breaks its agreement and violates the people's rights, it also violates natural law 
and thus God's will. When we take this into account, Locke's justification for rebellion is 
closer than it may first appear to be to Milton'S justification. Although Milton does not 
refer to natural law or the dissolution of government, his position here is similar to Locke's 
in that both assert that if government breaches its contract with the people, it also acts 
against God's will and it is just for the people to rebel. 
Like Locke, Milton also expresses a Christian view of history. For instance, Milton 
argues that if monarchy returns, the English 
are never like to attain thus far as we have now advanced to the recovery of our 
freedom, never to have it in possession as we now have it, never to be vouchsafed 
hereafter the like mercies and signal assistances from Heaven in our cause, ifby our 
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ungrateful backsliding we make these fruitless; flying now to regal concessions 
from his divine condescensions and gracious answers to our once importuning 
prayers against the tyranny which we then groaned under. (884) 
Here Milton asserts that the peoples' recent victory against the tyranny of Charles was 
achieved with God's help, but if they choose to reinstate monarchy then they will again 
suffer oppression. Moreover, they will never attain the freedom they have now because 
God will no longer help them. He also argues that England's contemporary situation 
reflects that of the Israelites before they made the mistake of choosing a king. Milton refers 
to 1 Samuel 8: 18, "And ye shall cry out in that day because of your king which ye shall 
have chosen you; and the Lord will not hear you in that day," and then writes, "us if he 
shall hear now, how much less will he hear when we cried hereafter, who once delivered by 
him from a king, and not without wondrous acts of his providence, and sensible and 
unworthy of those high mercies, are returning precipitantly, if he withhold us not, back to 
the captivity from whence he freed us!" (894). Milton argues that the English were heard 
by God, who helped them defeat Charles, just as the Israelites were heard by God before 
they decided they wanted a king.. If the English now make the same mistake as the 
Israelites and decide they too want a king, then they will return to captivity and this time 
God will not hear their cries for help. If, on the other hand, the English construct a free 
commonwealth, then "there can be no cause alleged why . . . all prosperity should not 
thereupon ensue throughout the whole land . . . (if God favour us, and our willful sins 
provoke him not) even to the coming of a true and rightful and only to be expected King .. 
the Messiah, the Christ" (891). Using the Bible as the record of human history, Milton 
argues here that if the English construct a free commonwealth and God favours them, then 
they should prosper until Christ's second coming. In the above passages, therefore, Milton 
expresses a Christian view of history. Historical events with outcomes that Milton favours, 
such as the defeat and execution of Charles and the construction of an English 
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commonwealth, are considered to be divinely sanctioned, whereas Milton considers the 
possible return to monarchical government at this time an insult to God and a violation of 
His will. Thus, Milton's political thought is the same as Locke's, in the sense that both of 
them express a linear Christian view of history, where the Bible is considered to be the 
historical record of human history and God is considered to be the arbitrator of human 
conflicts. 
Like Locke, Milton also asserts that government is only established through the 
consent of the people. Referring to Aristotle's Politics, Milton argues that originally men 
consented to be governed by a single person of outstanding virtue: "certain men at first, for 
the matchless excellence of their virtue above others, or some great public benefit, were 
created kings by the people, in small cities and territories, and in the scarcity of others to be 
found like them" (893). However, as these political cornmunities grew, "the number of 
prudent men increased," (893) so that when these kings became tyrants, the people were 
able to dispose of them and form free commonwealths. Milton then appeals to his readers 
"to find ... out and choose" the "worthy men" in "our own nation" with the ability to unite 
in council and "govern us" (893). Here Milton strongly suggests that government derives 
its authority from the people. Government is formed only after the people create a king or 
choose worthy men to govern. Elsewhere in The Ready and Easy Way, Milton refers to the 
ability to vote for the form of government the political society shall have as a "right" (895), 
a word that is at the heart of juridical "liberal" discourse. Moreover, he writes that "the 
ground and basis of every just and free government ... is a general council of ablest men, 
chosen by the people" (888, emphasis added). Although what Milton means by "the 
people" in this pamphlet differs from Locke's definition in Two Treatises a/Government (as 
I will demonstrate in the following paragraphs of this chapter), in the selected passages 
above Milton does agree with Locke that government originates in the consent of "the 
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people." There is, therefore, clear evidence that Milton expresses the liberal political 
concept in this pamphlet that the consent of "the people" is the foundation of government. 
Although both agree that government is established through consent, Milton's 
criticism of popular government in The Ready and Easy Way reveals that in this text he 
differs from Locke in an important way. In Chapter Two, I observed that Locke argues that 
once men have consented to form a political society, the will of the majority should 
determine the will of the whole community, and therefore the majority should decide what 
form of government shall exist. Although Locke's notion of "the majority" appears to 
exclude women, his political theory was nonetheless radically democratic for seventeenth-
century England. Ashcraft, for example, writes, "the notion that the fate of the country, 
dependent upon the decision to erect whatever form of government they desired, rested 
with 'the majority of the community,' not only would have, but as we have seen, did terrify 
people" (Revolutionary 583). In March 1660, when the majority were calling for the return 
of monarchy, this notion would have indeed terrified Milton. Not surprisingly, then, in The 
Ready and Easy Way, Milton is critical of democratic government. He notes that after the 
Second Civil War, Parliament resumed negotiations with Charles. David Smith explains 
that "most members of both Houses were unable to contemplate any settlement without the 
king and hence could see no alternative but to resume talks with him" (160). Milton, 
however, applauds those in the minority who refused to bargain with Charles, and who 
were assisted by Colonel Thomas Pride and his soldiers in purging the Parliament of 
"unfaithful" members. Milton describes the "faithful" members that were left as the "best 
principled of the people" and writes that they knew "that most voices ought not always to 
prevail where main matters are in question" (882). Here Milton clearly demonstrates that 
he does not endorse democracy when its results conflict with what he wants. During his 
argument for the establishment of a perpetual Senate, Milton anticipates that "it will be 
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objected that in those places where they had perpetual senates," such as Athens, Sparta, and 
Rome, "they had also popular remedies against their growing too imperious" (890). In 
response, Milton argues "that these remedies either little availed the people, or brought 
them to such a licentious and unbridled democracy as in fine ruined themselves with their 
own excessive power" (890). Milton explains "that the main reason urged why popular 
assemblies are to be trusted with the peoplets liberty, rather than a senate of principal men, 
[is that] ... great men will be still endeavouring to enlarge their power, but the common 
sort will be contented to maintain their own libertyu (890). Here Milton refers to the 
republican argument that the rich and powerful grandi desire Uto obtain power and glory for 
themselves ... at all costs, U whereas the main concern of the ordinary citizen "will usually 
be no more than to live a life of securityll (Skinner, IINegative Liberti' 205). Milton, 
however, rejects this argument, claiming that it "is by experience found false, none being 
more immoderate and ambitious to amplifY their power than such popularities" (890). So, 
unlike Locke, Milton, in The Ready and Easy Way, is clearly critical of rule dictated by the 
majority. 
In accordance with his criticism of popular government, Milton presents a very 
narrow definition of "the peopleu who can legitimately choose the fonn of England's 
government at this time. As I have mentioned above, Milton suggests that the people have 
the right to choose the fonn of government they want. Milton notes, for instance, that 
certain men Uwere created kings by the people, II but that uwhen they abused their power ... 
the people, soon disposing of their tyrants, betook them, in all civil est places, to the fonn of 
a free commonwealth" (893), Milton acknowledges that in the past the people have chosen 
monarchy as their government, but that when these kings have become tyrants the people 
have chosen to fonn a free commonwealth. This particular result of democracy is endorsed 
by Milton. However, it becomes clear that in The Ready and Easy Way Milton argues that 
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not all the people should have the right to choose the form of England's government at this 
time. For example, Milton wants to exclude all those who want Charles restored from 
having a legitimate vote in the up-coming elections. To do this, he first argues that all 
those people who in the past were devoted to kingship, having fought for the late King 
Charles, have lost their right to vote: "this greatest part have both in reason and the trial of 
just battle lost the right to the election what the government shall be" (895). Here Milton 
argues that because those who fought for Charles lost on the battlefield, they have also lost 
the right to vote for the form of government they want. Next, Milton states that "of them 
who have not lost that right, whether they for kingship be a greater number, who can 
certainly determine?" (895). He innocently suggests here that he does not know whether 
or not the majority of those who can legitimately vote (according to his criteria) will want 
Charles restored. If they do, however, Milton argues that their votes can be dismissed by 
the minority anyway. He says, 
suppose they be [in favour of Restoration], yet of freedom they partake all alike, one 
main end of government; which if the greater part value not, but will degenerately 
forego, is it just or reasonable that most voices against the main end of government 
shall enslave the less number that would be free? More just it is, doubtless, if they 
come to force, that a less number compel a greater to retain (which can be no wrong 
to them) their liberty, than that a greater number, for the pleasure of their baseness, 
compel a less most injuriously to be their fellow slaves. (895) 
In other words, Milton claims that votes in favour of a return to monarchy, irrespective of 
whether or not these votes denote the decision of the majority, represent a desire for the 
loss of liberty to all. It is unreasonable and unjust, says Milton, to impose such a desire 
upon those who do not wish to be enslaved, since one of the main ends of government is to 
guarantee freedom to all. In effect, then, Milton excludes all those who want monarchy 
restored from deciding on what foml of government England should have at this time, and 
he ultimately restricts his definition of "the people" only to those in the minority who, like 
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himself, do not want monarchy restored. fu other words, Milton's undemocratic political 
structure means that only those who agree with him will be allowed to vote. Barker writes 
that "it was government by men so enlightened, not by popular orders, that he desired in 
1660" (269). Locke, on the other hand, does not reject any particular fonn of government, 
and although he appears to exclude women from his definition of "the majority," he is 
willing to allow the majority of a political community to decide what fonn of government 
shall exist. fu this respect, then, Milton's political thought, in The Ready and Easy Way, 
differs from Lockean liberalism. 
Having established that "the people" will choose a free commonwealth, since to 
Milton this is the only legitimate choice, he then places restrictions on the people who can 
nominate and vote for members of the senate. When Milton says that lithe ground and basis 
of every just and free government ... is a general council of ablest men, chosen by the 
people, II (888) he does not mean "all the people" but rather lIa select group of the people." 
He argues that to preserve the commonwealth it will be necessary 
to well-qualify and refine elections, not committing all to the ways and shouting of 
a rude multitude, but pennitting only those of them who are rightly qualified to 
nominate as many as they will; and out of that number of a better breeding to 
choose a less number more judiciously, till after a third or fourth sifting and refining 
of exactest choice, they only be left chosen who are the due number and seem by 
most voices the worthiest. (891) 
Milton wants to restrict those who can nominate members and then put further restrictions 
on those who can actually vote to have these members elected into government. Moreover, 
he says that the way to "qualify" those people who can nominate and vote is by educating 
them: "To make the people fittest to choose, and then fittest to govern, will be to mend our 
corrupt and faulty education, [and] to teach the people faith" (891). In other words, only 
people that agree with his political thinking or have been taught to agree with his political 
thinking - are qualified to nominate and vote for the senators who will govern and 
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represent "the people." Thus, as well as restricting those who can legitimately choose 
England's form of government, Milton also restricts those who can legitimately choose the 
composition of England's government. In this sense, then, Milton's political thought again 
differs from Locke's. 
(v) 
Having examined both sides of the argument, we are now able to assess and make a 
final determination on Milton's political thought in The Ready and Easy Way. We have 
seen that Milton's political thought is similar to republican political thought in the following 
respects: he argues that a republic will create civic greatness; he equates republican 
govemment with freedom; he suggests that the citizens need to have certain virtues in order 
to construct and maintain a republican government; he emphasises the importance of 
citizens serving their state and implies that civil liberties must be earned; and he contrasts 
his support of republican government with criticism of monarchy. Many critics rely 
heavily on this last point as evidence of Milton's republicanism, yet there are important 
qualifications that must be recognised concerning Milton's criticism of monarchy in this 
pamphlet. We must recognise, for instance, that Milton's repudiation of monarchy is by no 
means absolute. At one point he applauds Christ as king and in another place in the text he 
admits that monarchy, even where Christ is not king, is not necessarily a bad form of 
government. By acknowledging these inconsistencies, we can conclude that Milton's 
criticism of monarchy is really designed to repudiate the tyranny of a particular expected 
monarch at a particular time, rather than monarchy in general. However, even if Milton's 
criticism of monarchy was absolute, it would still be necessary to recognise the differences 
between the reasons Milton expresses for opposing monarchy and those expressed by 
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Machiavelli. For, unlike Machiavelli, Milton cites Scripture to support his repudiation of 
monarchy and much of his criticism is indicative of his fear of losing freedom of religious 
worship. In some important respects, then, Milton's political thought is consistent with 
republican political thought, but in some other respects it is not. 
We have also observed that Milton's political thought is similar to liberal political 
thought in the following respects: he asserts that God created man free and that man is 
naturally free; he suggests that government should base its laws on the laws of nature; by 
asserting that government should protect the individual's natural freedom, he implies that 
natural law dictates that all humans remain free; he defends and emphasises the importance 
of religious toleration; he argues that if a government does not protect its citizen's liberties, 
then it may be justly resisted with force; he expresses a Christian view of history; and he 
asserts that government is only established through the consent of the people. Milton 
diverges from liberal political thought, however, by criticising rule dictated by the majority 
and by presenting a very narrow definition of "the people" who can legitimately choose the 
fonn and composition of England's government at this time. 
If we now review some of the more crucial points of contention between the 
indicators of republican and liberal political thought that are present in The Ready and Easy 
Way, we will be able to determine which of these political discourses is more prominent in 
this pamphlet. First, let us review how Milton presents the concept of freedom and its 
relationship to the individual and the state. He exclaims that God "didst create mankind 
free" (898), and that his fellow Englishmen must not "manacle the native liberty of 
mankind" (892). Throughout this pamphlet, he asserts that protecting this God-given 
natural freedom is "one main end of government" (895). The individual is presented as a 
bearer of freedom, and the declared purpose of government is to protect this freedom. 
These concepts are consistent with liberal political thought, but are challenged by the one 
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line where Milton says that under a free commonwealth civil liberties will only be enjoyed 
by "every person according to his merit" (896). As I mentioned earlier, here Milton appears 
to be advocating the republican theory of liberty. Although the meaning of the word 
"merit" here is by no means certain, it would be reasonable to argue by reason of context 
that by Hmerit" Milton is referring to how well a citizen serves the commonwealth. So he 
seems to be suggesting here that freedom is not a natural quality of man that government 
must protect, but a condition that must be earned. This republican notion of freedom, 
however, is outweighed in this pamphlet by the strong textual evidence which supports the 
assertion humans have a God-given natural freedom that government must protect. We can 
conclude, therefore, that the liberal conception of freedom is the more prominent in this 
pamphlet. 
Milton's perception of religion and history are other important indicators of whether 
republican or liberal political thought is more prominent in The Ready and Easy Way. The 
republican's primary concern is to establish civic greatness, which is best achieved by 
allowing citizens the freedom to pursue their chosen ends. This, in tum, is best achieved 
under a republic, and a republic must be maintained by virtuous citizens. In republican 
political theory, the importance of religion is only related to its ability to help enforce the 
law which in tum helps create virtuous citizens. This perception of religion, as a mere 
political tool, is never expressed by Milton in The Ready and Easy Way. Instead, 
throughout this pamphlet Milton expresses a liberal perception of religion. Like Locke, he 
emphasises the importance of a man's freedom to worship God in a manner that he thinks is 
best, and he considers this religious freedom to be "the best part of our liberty" (883). In 
accordance with his Protestantism, Milton also expresses a Christian vision of history. 
Recent historical events that Milton favours, such as the victory over Charles, are 
considered to be divinely sanctioned, whereas the possible readmission of monarchy at this 
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time is considered to be a violation of God's will. Moreover, at one point Milton argues 
that if the English construct a free commonwealth, they will prosper until Christ's second 
coming. This linear Christian view of history is also expressed by Locke and contrasts with 
MachiavelWs cyclical view of history. Thus, Milton is more liberal than republican in The 
Ready and Easy Way, in the sense that his perception of religion and history is similar to 
Locke's and contrasts with Machiavelli's. 
In summary, we can conclude that in The Ready and Easy Way, Milton in many 
ways conforms with aspects of both republican and liberal political thought. However, 
critics are wrong to rely solely on Milton's criticism of monarchy in this pamphlet as 
evidence of his republicanism, since this criticism is by no means absolute and is designed 
to prevent Charles from becoming monarch, rather than monarchy in general. Milton is 
also far from being the perfect example of a liberal in this pamphlet. His criticism of 
democracy and the restrictions he wants to put on those who can choose the form and 
composition of the English govermnent clearly contrasts with Lockean liberal political 
thought. On the more crucial points of contention between liberalism and republicanism, 
however, Milton sides with liberalism. The liberal notion that the individual has a natural 
freedom which govermnent must protect, is more prominent than the republican notion that 
freedom is a privilege that the individual must earn by serving his state. Moreover, 
Milton's emphasis on the importance of religious toleration and his Christian view of 
history are also consistent with liberal political thought and contrasts with republican 
political thought. Overall, then, Milton is more of a liberal than a republican in The Ready 
and Easy Way. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
Many critics regard Milton as a republican, while others consider him a liberal. 
This is problematic, for prominent political historians argue that republican political 
thought is distinct from liberal political thought. Skinner, for example, describes how 
under republican political thought the law is used to coerce citizens into fulfilling their civic 
duties so that they can remain free, whereas under liberal political thought freedom is 
considered to be a natural right that government must protect. Pocock argues that under 
republican political thought the individual is complete only when he participates in politics, 
but that under liberal political thought the individual is considered to be a bearer of rights 
which government must protect. Schochet observes that under republican political thought, 
individual liberties are considered to be privileges that must be created, whereas under 
liberal political thought, individual liberties are considered to be entitlements that precede 
organised politics. Given these accounts of liberal and republican political thought, it 
seemed impossible that Milton could be both a liberal and a republican. In order to 
determine what he is, I have looked at the ways in which Milton's political thought in Of 
Civil Power and The Ready and Easy Way is related to these two traditions of Western 
political thought. 
Liberalism, as it was formulated by Locke, is a political philosophy founded on 
Christian religious beliefs and a Christian view of history. The Lockean liberal asserts that 
God has declared his will in the form of natural law, and it is by virtue of this natural law 
that men in the state of nature have the natural right to live, be free, own assets, and judge 
and punish transgressors of natural law. However, because of the insecurities and dangers 
for man in the state of nature, men unite and form government to protect their property, and 
entrust to government their natural right to judge and punish transgressors of natural law. 
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In accordance with the belief that all humans have the natural right to be free, the liberal 
also asserts that government is only established through the consent of the people. 
Moreover, the liberal asserts that force should not be used in matters of religion, although it 
is legitimate for anyone to persuade another that his way of worshipping God is best. For 
the liberal, church and state are separate institutions with distinct functions. The church can 
legitimately use persuasion, but not force, in order to try to save souls. The state, on the 
other hand, can legitimately use force (and persuasion) in order to protect individual 
property rights. According to the liberal, however, if a government fails to protect 
individual property rights and uses force without lawful authority, then it is dissolved, 
everyone returns to the state of nature, and a state of war arises in which the people have 
the right to defend themselves as they see fit and punish their attackers. 
In Of Civil Power, Milton conforms with this defmition of liberalism in a number of 
ways. Like Locke, he promotes religious toleration and argues that the state should not use 
its force in matters of religion because, under the gospel, no one can infallibly determine 
God's will, force is ineffectual at changing belief and establishing faith, and Christ neither 
wants .nor needs force to be used in this way. Like Locke, Milton also asserts that the state 
can legitimately use force in civil matters, and that although the church must never use 
force, it can legitimately use persuasion to change belief, establish faith, and increase 
membership. 
However, because, as Walker points out, Locke's theory of religious toleration is 
limited, I found it necessary to extend further and refine my initial definition of liberalism, 
so that it is recognised as harbouring a limited theory of religious toleration. In Of Civil 
Power, Milton's theory of religious toleration is also limited. Milton argues, like Locke, 
that under theocracy, religious persecution is justified. Moreover, he argues that religious 
practices that conflict with the interests of the state should not be tolerated, and that those 
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who interpret scripture in a way that is probably wrong should not be tolerated. Thus, the 
state can, under certain circumstances, repress any religious belief or practice. Milton 
exploits this qualification in his theory of religious toleration and argues that Catholics 
should not be tolerated by the state. He argues that they should not be tolerated because 
they are the subjects of a foreign prince and therefore a threat to the state; they believe that 
they have infallible knowledge of God's will; and they use force against those who have 
different religious beliefs and practices. He also suggest that Catholics are idolaters and 
asserts that idolaters should not be tolerated. Ultimately, then, Milton's theory of religious 
toleration, like Locke's, only applies to Protestants. This is because the political thought of 
both Locke and Milton derives from their Protestant religious beliefs. Thus, they can never 
really separate church and state, and they both end up condoning state persecution of all 
those who do not conform with their political assertions, or who hold religious beliefs that 
conflict with their political assertions. Because Milton's political thought in O/Civil Power 
is the same in many important respects as Locke's political thought in the Letter, there are 
strong grounds for thinking of this tract as a liberal tract. There are, however, no grounds 
for thinking of Milton as a republican in this tract. 
By taking the arguments of Machiavelli as their model, Skinner and Pocock provide 
us with a comprehensive definition of republican political thought. Essentially, the 
republican asserts that to achieve civic greatness citizens must live a free way of life. A 
free way of life only occurs in the free state and, according to Skinner, Machiavelli argues 
that the form that such a state must take is a republic: a government consisting of rulers or 
magistrates who "must always be elected," "must always remain subject to the laws and 
institutions of the city which elect them," and "must always act to promote the common 
good" (liThe State" 1 08). The republican also asserts that a state will only remain free if its 
citizens cultivate certain virtues, such as courage and prudence, necessary to protect it from 
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internal and external servitude. Thus, it is in the citizen's best interest to cultivate these 
virtues because they enable him to protect the freedom of his state, which in turn means 
that he will be able to enjoy personal freedom. However, the republican also relies upon 
the law, which ideally should be supported by influences of a religion, to ensure that 
citizens cultivate the virtues necessary to protect their state and hence their own personal 
freedom. Pocock argues that Machiavelli subordinates religion to politics, because to 
Machiavelli religion was considered to be a mere political tool that could be used to instil 
civic virtue within the people. Moreover, according to Pocock, republicans believed that all 
political institutions are eventually devoured by corruption and that new institutions are 
then established and the process continues. Thus, Pocock observes that republicans express 
a cyclical vision of history. 
Milton's political thought in The Ready and Easy Way is consistent with republican 
political thought in the following respects: he argues that a republic will create civic 
greatness; he equates republican government with freedom; he suggests that citizens need 
to have certain virtues in order to construct and maintain a republican government; he 
emphasises the importance of citizens serving their state; he implies that civil liberties must 
be earned; and he contrasts his support of republican government with criticism of 
monarchy. 
However, there are two important qualifications that must be made to the claim that 
Milton's criticism of monarchy in The Ready and Easy Way is evidence of his 
republicanism. First, it is important to recognise that the reasons Milton expresses for 
opposing monarchy are often different from those expressed by Machiavelli and the 
classical republicans. Milton often uses Scripture to support claims that monarchy is sinful, 
exploitative, excessive, wasteful, superficial, and a threat to religious freedom. Machiavelli 
and the classical republicans, on the other hand, never use Scripture to support their claims, 
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are not concerned with religious freedom, and only oppose monarchy for its general 
inability to promote the common good. Secondly, Milton's condemnation of monarchy is 
by no means absolute. At one point in the text, he applauds monarchy where Christ is king. 
Moreover, elsewhere in the text he indicates that he is not opposed to monarchies in 
principle, even ones where Christ is not king. It is not the case, then, as Woolrych asserts, 
that in The Ready and Easy Way "the condemnation of monarchy is absolute" (216). Nor is 
it true that in 1659-60, Milton unambiguously renounced monarchy of all kinds ("Milton 
and Marchamont" 166), as Worden claims. Hollis' assertion that The Ready and Easy Way 
"denounces monarchy in all its forms" (66) is also incorrect, as is Norbrook's claim that 
ItMilton sees kingship as a form of blasphemy" (414). Similarly, Skinner is clearly 
mistaken when he makes the following generalisation: "Milton eventually came to accept" 
the view, by the time he wrote The Ready and Easy Way, "that a self-governing republic is 
the only type of regime under which a community can hope to obtain greatness at the same 
time as guaranteeing its citizens their individual liberty" ("Republican Ideal" 303). Many 
of these critics like to think of The Ready and Easy Way as a clear indication that Milton 
was by this time a committed republican, in the sense of repudiating monarchy and 
asserting republican forms of government. They fail to recognise, however, that some of 
the passages in The Ready and Easy Way indicate that Milton is not opposed to monarchies 
in principle. By acknowledging these passages we can conclude that Milton is only 
opposed to monarchy in England -at this time, because he believes that the expected 
monarch, Charles, will be a tyrant. So although Milton is not opposed to monarchy in 
principle, he expresses unqualified criticism of monarchy throughout most this pamphlet as 
a rhetorical strategy to help him convince his readers not to make Charles king. His 
argument is therefore really designed to repudiate tyranny, not monarchy. These findings 
clearly qualify the sense in which Milton is a republican in The Ready and Easy Way. 
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Milton's political thought in The Ready and Easy Way is also consistent with liberal 
political thought in a number of different ways. In some places in this text, Milton asserts 
that man was created free, that man is naturally free, and that government should protect 
man's freedom. Moreover, Milton suggests that government should base its laws on the 
laws of nature and, given that he asserts that humans have a God-given natural freedom that 
government should protect, it is reasonable to conclude that for Milton, as for Locke, one of 
the laws of nature is that humans remain free. Like Locke, Milton also asserts that if 
government officials violate the people's liberties, they also violate God's will and it is just 
for the people to rebel against them. Milton's defence of religious toleration and emphasis 
on the importance of religious freedom are also consistent with Lockean liberalism. For 
both Locke and Milton, religious freedom is the highest priority, since it is a condition 
which is necessary for pleasing God and finding eternal salvation. Moreover, Milton 
expresses a Christian view of history, and he suggests that government is founded on the 
consent of the people. However, Milton is far from being the perfect liberal in this 
pamphlet. Unlike Locke, Milton criticises the rule of the majority and presents a very 
narrow definition of "the people" who can legitimately choose the form and composition of 
England's government at this time. Put simply, Milton does not endorse democracy when 
its results conflict with what he wants. 
Thus, Milton's political thought in The Ready and Easy Way is both consistent and 
inconsistent in a number of ways with both republican and liberal political thought. But 
this tract is more liberal than republican because the liberal notion that humans have a God-
given natural freedom that government must protect is more prominent in this pamphlet 
than the republican notion that personal freedom is a privilege that must be earned. Like 
Locke, Milton also defends religious freedom and emphasises its importance, and he never 
expresses the republican notion of religion as a mere political tool. Moreover, like Locke, 
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Milton expresses a Christian vision of history, which contrasts with Machiavelli's cyclical 
view of history_ Overall, then, Milton is more of a liberal than a republican in The Ready 
and Easy Way. 
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